Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution by Lichtenbaum, Peter
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 19 Issue 4 
1998 
Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution 
Peter Lichtenbaum 
Steptoe & Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Organizations Law Commons, and the 
Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195 (1998). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol19/iss4/6 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN WTO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Peter Lichtenbaum*
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY .......................................................... 1195
I. BACKGROUND ON WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM .......... 1198
A . GA TT P ractice ................................................................... 1198
B. Uruguay Round Reforms ................................................... 1200
II. PRELIM INARY ISSUES ................................................................. 1202
A . Right to Counsel ................................................................ 1203
B. Standing to Challenge ....................................................... 1207
C . R ipeness ............................................................................. 12 13
D . M ootness ............................................................................ 12 15
E. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies .................................... 1220
III. ISSUES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE PANEL PROCEEDINGS ............. 1224
A. Panel Terms of Reference .................................................. 1225
1. Scope of Panel Review ................................................ 1225
2. Judicial Econom y ........................................................ 1231
B. Standard of Review ............................................................ 1233
C. Role of Precedent ............................................................... 1244
1. Effect of Panel Reports ............................................... 1244
2. Effect of Appellate Body Decisions ............................ 1247
D . Burden of Proof ................................................................. 1248
E. Panel Fact-Finding ............................................................ 1252
IV. ISSUES RELATING TO REMEDIES ................................................ 1254
A. Nature of Remedies ............................................................ 1254
B. Compliance with WTO Rulings ......................................... 1259
V. ISSUES IN APPELLATE BODY REVIEW ........................................ 1264
A . Scope of Review ................................................................. 1265
B. Issues of Law vs. Issues of Fact.. ................ 1266
C. Standard of Review of Panel Decisions ............................. 1270
C ONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1273
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") is the centerpiece of the new organization. Unlike many other
* Peter Lichtenbaum is a senior associate in the international trade practice of Steptoe
& Johnson LLP in Washington, D.C.
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international organizations, the WTO has a dispute settlement system, to
which its Members must submit, with the authority to issue binding le-
gal judgments on issues of great political and economic significance.
WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero has described dispute resolu-
tion as "the WTO's most individual contribution to the stability of the
global economy."' WTO dispute settlement is important, not just for
international trade matters, but for what it portends for the future of in-
ternational dispute settlement. The global community's ability to resolve
highly-charged disputes successfully in the trade area will bode well for
dispute resolution in other areas.'
Since its introduction in 1995, the WTO dispute settlement system
has grappled with several significant procedural issues. Given the im-
portance of WTO dispute settlement, these issues deserve consideration.
While the WTO has detailed guidelines for dispute settlement, the
guidelines do not explicitly address or resolve many of the procedural
issues. The initial WTO decisions are, therefore, especially important to
the development of the procedural law in the trade area.
This article identifies particularly significant procedural issues that
are arising in WTO dispute resolution and comments on the possible
evolutionary paths of the law. This task requires that the article strike a
balance between breadth of coverage and depth of coverage. As a result,
the article does not aim to provide a complete discussion of all aspects
of the WTO dispute resolution system and generally does not discuss
issues that have not been addressed by WTO panels.' The article does
1. WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero, Address to the Korean Business Associa-
tion (Apr. 17, 1997), available at The Future Path of the Multilateral Trading System (last
modified Mar. 20, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/speeches/seoul.htm>.
2. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GAiT/WTO Dispute
Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE
GATT/WTO DIsPUTE SETrLEMENT SYSTEM 1997, at 3, 25 (Studies in Transnational Eco-
nomic Law Vol. 11, 1997) (stating that "many governments view the GATT/WTO dispute
settlement system as a model for enforcing international economic rules" and suggesting
several reasons for this view).
3. For instance, the article does not discuss issues such as: consultations prior to the
formation of a panel; transparency in WTO proceedings; the desire of non-governmental
parties to participate in dispute resolution; and the role of experts in WTO proceedings. On
the issue of consultations, see generally Gary Horlick, The Consultation Phase of WTO Dis-
pute Resolution: A Private Practitioner's View, in 32 INT'L LAWYER (1998) (dealing with the
issue of consultations). On the issue of transparency in WTO proceedings, see generally
Whitney Debevoise, Access to Documents in Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice
and Suggestions for Greater Transparency, in 32 INT'L LAWYER (1998) (concerning the issue
of transparency in WTO proceedings). On the role of non-governmental parties in dispute
resolution, see generally Bernd-Roland Killman, The Access of Individuals to International
Trade Dispute Settlement, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1996, at 143. See also Martin Lukas, The Role
of Private Parties in the Enforcement of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J. WORLD
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not seek to provide an exhaustive analysis of each issue discussed, and
therefore deals briefly with the background under the WTO's predeces-
sor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT').
4
After providing background in Section I on the WTO dispute reso-
lution system and its origins in the GATT, this article discusses the
particularly significant procedural issues that are arising in WTO dis-
pute resolution. For each issue discussed, the article summarizes the
nature of the issue and analyzes WTO precedent and relevant provisions
in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes ("DSU").
Section II addresses issues that arise prior to a panel's review of the
substantive complaint brought before it. The issues discussed are: (a) the
right of a WTO Member to be represented by private counsel; (b)
whether there is any limitation on a WTO Member's standing to chal-
lenge another Member's practice; (c) when a challenge is considered
ripe for dispute settlement; (d) whether a challenge may become moot,
precluding effective dispute settlement; and (e) whether exhaustion of
domestic remedies is required before a Member may raise a particular
issue before the WTO panel.
Section III analyzes issues arising in the course of the panel's re-
view of the merits of the challenge. The issues discussed are: (a) the
scope of a panel's review of a Member's action (e.g., how the panel
must determine what substantive claims are properly before it, and
whether a panel must address all such claims); (b) the standard of re-
view that a panel will apply to the substantive claim (i.e., whether the
panel will defer to the challenged Member's factual findings and inter-
pretation of its WTO obligations); (c) the effect of past panel and
TRADE 182, 183-206 (Oct. 1995) (discussing the role of non-governmental parties in dispute
resolution). Two environmental non-governmental organizations recently attempted to file
an amicus curiae brief (unsuccessfully) with a WTO panel. See WTO Secretariat, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, paras. 7-8
(May 15, 1998) [hereinafter United States-Shrimp]. The panel held that only parties and
third parties are allowed to submit information directly to the panel. The United States was
allowed to attach part of the brief to the United States' own second submission to the panel.
See id. para. 8.
4. There are several texts that address GATT practice regarding procedural issues gen-
erally. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM (1989); JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 163-89
(1969). Professor Hudec's book contains a very useful bibliography. See HUDEC, supra at
610-19.
5. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
[hereinafter DSU], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization [hereinafter WTO Agreement), Annex 2 (last downloaded June 11, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/legallfinalacthtm>.
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Appellate Body decisions on the panel's approach; (d) the allocation of
the burden of proof in the proceedings; and (e) the panel's authority to
seek additional facts in order to resolve the legal issues before it.
Section IV discusses issues relating to the remedies a panel may
authorize if it finds a violation has occurred. The issues discussed are:
(a) the availability of retroactive remedies (i.e., whether the remedy is
limited to changes in practice in futuro, or whether the panel may re-
quire the Member to take some action to remedy past wrongs); and (b)
the timing of the Member's compliance with the panel's ruling.
Section V addresses issues arising in the context of Appellate Body
review of a panel decision. These issues include: (a) the scope of Ap-
pellate Body review; (b) the distinction between issues of fact and issues
of law; and (c) the standard of review applied to the panel's decision.
I. BACKGROUND ON WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM
Some background on the WTO dispute resolution system is neces-
sary to an understanding of the legal context for the procedural issues
discussed below. Although sweeping changes were made to the dispute
resolution mechanisms in the transition from the GATT to the WTO, the
procedures used under the WTO have evolved out of the original GATT
system. The DSU, which governs WTO dispute settlement, borrows
many provisions taken directly from the previous GATT agreements on
dispute settlement.6 In addition, WTO panels and the Appellate Body
still refer to GATT panel decisions to show past practice on procedural
legal issues if the issue is germane to a dispute under the WTO.7
A. GATT Practice
The GATT system included dispute settlement provisions from its
inception.' Parties to a dispute were first encouraged to seek bilaterally a
6. Petersmann provides a list of the successive GATT decisions and understandings
relating to dispute settlement. Petersmann, supra note 2, at 35. For a detailed history of dis-
pute resolution under the GATT, see, for example, ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975).
7. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages: AB-1996-2,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, and WT/DSI I/AB/R at 14 (Oct. 4,1996) (last downloaded
May 20, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter Japan-Alcohol
Taxes (Appellate Body)] ("Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis.
They are often considered by subsequent panels").
8. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 24:
Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, in THE
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mutually satisfactory resolution without outside interference. If such
negotiations were unsuccessful, a panel of experts could convene on an
ad hoc basis. Panels could review submissions of interested parties, hear
oral argument, and rule on the dispute. The panels would submit their
rulings only to the interested parties initially in order to give friendly
settlement another opportunity. These rulings acquired legal status un-
der the GATT if adopted by the GATT Council, which was composed of
all the members of the GATI' (known as the Contracting Parties).
This system encountered many problems that eventually led to
widespread frustration that the GATT did not provide effective dispute
settlement. The party complained against had the power to delay and
effectively block a resolution of the dispute for several reasons. Until
1989, when some improvements were made, the party had the ability to
prevent the establishment of a panel.9 After agreeing to establish a
panel, the party could delay any agreement regarding the panel's terms
of reference and the selection of panelists."0 Even after the 1989 im-
provements, a single Contracting Party, including the party against
which the panel report (i.e., the panel's decision) came out, could block
the GATT Council's adoption of a report." In the event that the GATT
Council adopted a report, the GATr had no mechanism to force the of-
fending party to withdraw the measures inconsistent with the GATT or
to pay compensation to injured parties. The injured party could not be
certain that the GATT Council would authorize the injured party to re-
taliate with equivalent measures against the offending party. In addition,
the GATI did not guarantee that the GATT Council would monitor the
offending party's actions unless the injured parties prompted the Coun-
cil to do so.
GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS AcT 461-70 (H.A. Applebaum
& L.M. Schlitt eds., 1995).
9. See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 210, 212, para. 10 [hereinafter
1979 Understanding], (request for panels to be dealt with "in accordance with standard prac-
tice," i.e., by consensus decision-making). In 1989, it was agreed to provide for automatic
establishment of panels. See Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Pro-
cedures (Apr. 12, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) 61, 63, para. F(a) [hereinafter 1989
Improvements].
10. 1979 Understanding, supra note 9, para. 11 (requiring agreement of the parties con-
cerned to the composition of a panel) & para. 12 (allowing parties to oppose panel members
for "compelling reasons."). A panel's "terms of reference" circumscribe the issues it may
consider. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 7.1; see also infra Part III.A. The 1989 improvements
provided for standard terms of reference and for automatic appointment of panelists. See
1989 Improvements, supra note 9, paras. F(b) & F(c).
11. 1989 Improvements, supra note 9, para. G ("The practice of adopting panel reports
by consensus shall be continued.. "').
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This approach reflected a more political and less legalistic means of
resolving disputes-what Professor Jackson has termed "power-
oriented" rather than "rule-oriented" dispute settlement-and reflected
traditional concerns that trade disputes were highly politicized, and that
applying rigid rules would not settle disputes effectively." However, the
traditional thinking began to change in the 1970's as the United States
came to recognize the benefits of achieving clear rules that would be
effectively enforced. The U.S. advocacy of a more judicialized, binding
dispute settlement process derived largely from the increased focus of
U.S. trade policy on achieving market access abroad and from a recog-
nition that a strong multilateral remedy was preferable to threats of
unilateral trade retaliation. U.S. pressure resulted in the 1979 Tokyo
Round "Framework Agreement" on dispute resolution, which codified
existing GATT dispute settlement practices. 3
In the 1980's, the GATT saw a "dramatic increase in non-
compliance with dispute settlement rulings," due partly to the ongoing
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.14 In addition, the establishment of
panels experienced frequent delays. As a result of these frustrations,
other GATT members (especially the European Community) joined the
United States in pushing for an overhaul of the GAIT dispute settlement
system.
6
B. Uruguay Round Reforms
Dispute resolution was one of the fifteen original Uruguay Round
topics for discussion. After years of debate, the Uruguay Round agree-
ments established the new WTO and, with it, a new Dispute Settlement
Understanding that made sweeping changes to the GAT1 dispute reso-
lution mechanism.
The new system is based on the rule of law. The system's goals are
clarity and certainty in dispute resolution procedures while still encour-
aging bilateral settlement by the parties. 7 The most significant feature
12. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 109-12.
13. See 1979 Understanding, supra note 9, at 210.
14. Petersmann, supra note 2, at 53.
15. Id.
16. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 8, at 262-64.
17. See WTO Secretariat, About the WTO; Settling Disputes: The WTO's "Most Indi-
vidual Contribution" (last updated Feb. 6, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/about
disputel.htm>. See DSU, supra note 5, at art. 3.2 (dispute settlement "is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system"); id. art. 3.7 ("A
solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered
agreements is clearly to be preferred").
1200 [Vol. 19:1195
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of the DSU is that it enables complainants to have a panel established,
obtain a ruling from the panel, and obtain authority to retaliate, if neces-
sary, all without the consent of the defending Member."8 Under the DSU,
dispute resolution proceeds automatically, subject only to a consensus
decision not to go forward. Parties may now appeal a panel report to an
Appellate Body. The new system also provides for surveillance of the
implementation of panel reports and compensation, or authorization of
retaliation if the report is not implemented within a reasonable period of
time. Expedited arbitration is available regarding (1) what constitutes a
reasonable period of time for implementation, and (2) what compensa-
tion or retaliation is reasonable.
The WTO approach to dispute resolution is more formalistic than
that under the GATT, and, as such, the WTO approach provides strict
deadlines for completion of each phase of the dispute resolution proc-
ess. A normal case should not take more than one year to resolve, or
fifteen months if it is appealed. At all phases, parties are encouraged to
discuss the problem and settle the dispute themselves.
Bilateral consultation between the concerned parties remains the
first phase of dispute resolution.'9 If the consultations fail to settle the
dispute within sixty days, then the complaining Member may request
the establishment of a panel.'
Resolving disputes where consultations have not settled the matter
is the responsibility of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") (i.e., the
General Council, consisting of all WTO Members). The DSB has sole
authority to establish panels. Establishment of a panel may take up to
forty-five days. A Member can block the creation of a panel at the first
DSB meeting following the panel request, but at the second DSB meet-
ing the panel will be established.2
The DSU describes in detail how panels are to operate. The panel
normally has six months to conclude the case.22 Panels both receive sev-
eral written submissions from the parties and hear oral arguments. The
panel submits its conclusions in an interim report to the Members in-
volved. The parties have one week to ask for review. If review is sought,
the panel may take another two weeks to hold additional meetings. The
final report is submitted to the two sides and circulated to all WTO
18. See DSU, supra note 5, arts. 4.3, 6.1, 8.7, 16.4, 17.14, 22.6.
19. See id. art. 4.
20. See id. art. 4.7.
21. See id. art. 6.1.
22. See id. art. 12.8. This period is shortened to three months in cases involving perish-
able goods. Id. Conversely, the period can be extended to as long as nine months if the panel
considers it necessary. Id. art. 12.9.
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Members. Sixty days later, the report becomes the DSB's ruling unless
Members vote to reject it.
Either involved Member may appeal a panel's decision to the Ap-
pellate Body. The Member must base its appeal on a point of law, as the
Appellate Body cannot reexamine evidence or admit new evidence. The
Appellate Body consists of seven permanent members, and a "division"
of three members hears each appeal. These individuals are not affiliated
with any government. The Appellate Body can uphold, modify or re-
verse a panel decision. Appeals should not last more than sixty days,
with an absolute maximum of ninety days in special cases.
If a violation is found, the panel or Appellate Body will recommend
that the offending Member bring its measure into compliance with the
panel's ruling.23 The Member must follow the recommendations in the
panel or Appellate Body report.24 The Member must state its intention to
do so before the DSB within thirty days of the report's adoption. The
Member is given a reasonable period of time in which to implement the
recommendations.2' If the Member fails to do so, the offending party
must enter into negotiations with the injured party to determine mutu-
ally acceptable compensation. If no agreement can be reached, the
injured party may ask for permission to suspend trade concessions pre-
viously granted to the offending Member. Permission will be granted
unless the DSB comes to a consensus against suspension of concessions,
or the offending Member requests arbitration regarding the level of trade
concessions to be suspended.26
Though the DSU is fairly detailed about the process of dispute
resolution, many questions remain open for the lawyer involved in
bringing or defending a WTO suit before a panel or the Appellate Body.
These issues are just beginning to be dealt with under the new WTO
system, and final resolution of them may take years.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Certain preliminary issues can arise before a panel ever considers the
merits of the substantive complaint. Can a Member be represented by
whomever it wants? Can a Member challenge any measure of another
23. See id. art. 19.1 (panel or Appellate Body "shall recommend that the Member con-
cerned bring the measure into conformity").
24. See id. art. 21.1.
25. See id. art. 21.3.
26. See id. art. 22.6. For more detail on the process, see generally the WTO's Website at
<http://www.wto.org>.
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Member, or are Members subject to some standing limitation? Can pan-
els only decide cases that are ripe for panel review? Alternatively, is the
case already moot? Can a case be dismissed, or narrowed, because the
complaining Member failed to exhaust its domestic remedies? WTO
panels and the Appellate Body appear to be taking a rather flexible ap-
proach to many of these questions, perhaps to avoid dismissing bona
fide trade disputes on procedural grounds and, more generally, to avoid
the miring of the WTO dispute settlement system in procedural niceties,
particularly at preliminary stages.27
A. Right to Counsel
When a WTO Member brings a challenge, is the Member entitled to
hire outside attorneys to represent it in all phases of the dispute resolu-
tion process, including panel hearings and oral arguments? This
question raises important issues about the nature of WTO dispute reso-
lution. As discussed above, traditional GAT dispute resolution was
viewed as something more akin to diplomatic negotiations than to court-
room litigation. Allowing outside counsel a greater role in dispute
resolution is a symbolic recognition of the more adversarial nature of
the new DSU system.
The DSU does not address this issue, nor has the WTO established
any other rules or guidelines regarding the ways in which countries may
work with outside counsel. GATT 1947 panel decisions did not address
this issue either. In GAIT practice, outside counsel increasingly worked
with governments, most commonly in the capacity of counsel to private
entities whose interests were aligned with the government's interests.
On occasion, however, outside counsel had directly assisted the gov-
ernment itself.
The EC-Bananas decisions' addressed this issue, but failed to re-
solve it definitively. EC-Bananas involved a challenge by Ecuador,
27. A preliminary issue that is unlikely to arise is that of jurisdiction. The issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction normally does not arise in WTO dispute settlement because all Members
have submitted to panel jurisdiction by acceding to the WTO Agreement. Issues of subject
matter jurisdiction also normally will not arise because the DSU expressly applies to all
disputes brought under the dispute settlement provisions of the multilateral WTO agree-
ments. See DSU, supra note 5, at art. 1; see also Giorgio Sacerdoti, Appeal and Judicial
Review in International Arbitration and Adjudication: The Case of the WTO Appellate Re-
view, in Petersmann, supra note 2, at 247, 274 (issues of jurisdiction "have practically never
arisen within GATT, contrary to what often happens in inter-state litigation generally").
28. WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas: Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) (last downloaded May 20, 1998) <http://
www.wto.org/disputelbulletinl.htm> [hereinafter EC-Bananas (Panel Report)]; WTO
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Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States (the "Complaining
Parties") to the EC's regime for the importation, sale, and distribution of
bananas. Saint Lucia, appearing as a third party, sought representation
by private counsel before the panel. The panel rejected this request in
part because the panel's working procedures had specified that only
members of governments would be present at panel meetings. 29 The
panel also stated that the participation of private lawyers could give rise
to concerns about confidentiality, could result in large financial burdens
for smaller states if such participation became common practice to hire
private lawyers, and could change the "intergovernmental character" of
WTO dispute settlement °
Because Saint Lucia was a third party in the proceedings, it did not
have the right to appeal the panel's ruling on the "right to counsel" is-
sue. However, after the EC and the Complaining Parties appealed
certain other issues to the Appellate Body, Saint Lucia then requested
that its private counsel be allowed to participate in the Appellate Body's
oral hearing. Saint Lucia argued that governments have a sovereign right
to decide who constitutes their official government representatives and
delegation, and that nothing in the DSU or the Appellate Body's Work-
ing Procedures restricts a Member's right to nominate private lawyers as
its counsel.31 The Complaining Parties opposed Saint Lucia's request,
arguing that allowing private lawyers to participate in oral hearings was
contrary to established GAT' practice, and that there was no established
proposition of international law that a government can decide whom to
name as its official representatives to an international body. The Com-
plaining Parties also raised concerns that allowing private lawyers to
participate was inconsistent with the DSU's purpose of promoting dis-
pute settlement among governments and would raise difficult questions
regarding lawyers' ethics, conflicts of interest, representation of multi-
ple governments, and confidentiality.3"
Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas: AB-1997-3, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9 1997) (last downloaded May 20, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletin1.htm> [hereinafter EC-Bananas (Appellate Body)].
29. See EC-Bananas (Panel Report), supra note 28, para. 7.11.
30. See id.; See R.S.J. Martha, Representation of Parties in World Trade Disputes, 31 J.
WORLD TRADE 83 (1997) (criticizing the EC-Bananas Panel decision to exclude private
attorneys).
31. EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, para. 5. Saint Lucia was joined by
several other third parties (Belize, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ghana, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, and Suriname) in argu-
ing that the panel had erred in not allowing Saint Lucia's private counsel to participate, based
on the general principle of international law that sovereign states are free to choose the rep-
resentation of their choice. Id. para. 108.
32. See id. paras. 8-9.
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The Appellate Body decided to allow the private lawyers for Saint
Lucia to participate in the oral hearing. The Appellate Body stated that
nothing in the WTO Agreement, the DSU, or the Appellate Body's
Working Procedures specified who can represent a government making
representations in an oral hearing of the Appellate Body. Given this le-
gal vacuum, the Appellate Body relied on two policy arguments. First,
the Appellate Body noted that "representation by counsel of a govern-
ment's own choice may well be a matter of particular significance-
especially for developing-country Members-to enable them to partici-
pate fully in dispute settlement proceedings."33 Second, the Appellate
Body stated that "given the Appellate Body's mandate to review only
issues of law or legal interpretation in panel reports, it is particularly
important that governments be represented by qualified counsel in Ap-
pellate Body proceedings."34
While EC-Bananas makes clear that private counsel can partici-
pate in oral hearings of the Appellate Body, the situation in panel
hearings is less clear. This issue, as noted, could not be considered by
the Appellate Body due to Saint Lucia's third party status. Moreover,
one of the reasons given by the Appellate Body for its ruling-the pe-
culiarly legal nature of its own proceedings-would not apply as fully at
the panel level as they would at the appellate level. However, at least
two recent panels have reportedly allowed private counsel to participate
in oral hearings. 5
Most recently, the issue of the right to private counsel arose in the
Indonesia-Autos dispute. At the first substantive meeting of the panel
with the parties, Indonesia announced that two private lawyers were
members of its delegation. The United States requested that these law-
yers be excluded from the meeting. The panel made a preliminary ruling
on this issue and rejected the U.S. request. 6 The panel stated that:
We conclude it is for the Government of Indonesia to nominate
the members of its delegation to meetings of this Panel, and we
find no provision in the WTO Agreement or the DSU, including
the standard rules of procedure included therein, which prevents
a WTO Member from determining the composition of its
33. Id. para. 12.
34. Id. para. 12.
35. See WTO Official, statement at the ABA Symposium on the First Three Years of the
WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995-1997), in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 20, 1998) (on file
with author) [hereinafter ABA Symposium]; see also Horlick, supra note 3 (citing Panel Re-
port of Oct. 3, 1996 re Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
WT/DS59 [hereinafter Indonesia-Autos]).
36. See Indonesia-Autos, supra note 35, para 14.1 of Panel Findings.
1205Summer 19981
Michigan Journal of International Law
delegation to WTO panel meetings. Nor does past practice in
GATT and WTO dispute settlement point us to a different
conclusion in this case. In particular, we note that unlike in this
present case, the working procedures of the Bananas III panel
contained a specific provision requiring the presence only of
government officials.37
The panel went on to emphasize that the private lawyers, like all
members of a Member's delegation, were subject to the standard work-
ing procedures of the panel, including requirements of confidentiality.3"
Thus, despite a U.S. objection, the panel allowed private lawyers to par-
ticipate as full members of a Member's delegation to the panel.
Staff lawyers at the Office of the United-States Trade Representative
("USTR") have argued that private counsel should not be allowed to
attend panel hearings, let alone present arguments. The U.S. lawyers
argued that private counsel would not appreciate the importance of
having to consider both sides of a legal position-i.e., that while a gov-
ernment might find a particular position in its interest in one case, the
government would be reluctant to take that position if the position
would be adverse to its interests in another case. USTR lawyers argued
that having to consider both sides of a position in this way meant that
governments were constrained from taking extreme positions.39 How-
ever, this argument presumes that private counsel are given carte
blanche to litigate as they see fit, which is quite unlikely. Private counsel
will normally have to seek their government clients' approval of any
arguments they intend to make, a process that will ensure that all aspects
of the governments' interests are considered. Moreover, private counsel
are already allowed to draft WTO Members' briefs in dispute settle-
mentP4 That new arguments will be advanced in the oral hearing, such
that a risk of "extreme" arguments would result from the participation of
private counsel, seems improbable.
37. See id. The reference to the Bananas III panel is to the EC-Bananas decision dis-
cussed above.
38. See id.
39. Statements of USTR Official, International Law Association Conference, New York,
N.Y. (Nov. 1997) (on file with author).
40. See EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, para. 11 ("[lIt is well-known that
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, many governments seek and obtain extensive assis-
tance from private counsel, who are not employees of the governments concerned, in
advising on legal issues; preparing written submissions to panels as well as to the Appellate
Body; preparing written responses to questions from panels and from other parties as well as
from the Appellate Body; and other preparatory work relating to panel and Appellate Body
proceedings").
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Seeking to persuade the U.S. government to change its opposition to
participation by private counsel, the American Bar Association ("ABA")
has approved a Recommendation that WTO dispute procedures should:
assure all parties the right to be represented by counsel of their
selection, including non-government personnel duly accredited
by the government using such assistance, in all phases of the
dispute settlement process from the request for consultation to
the implementation of panel and Appellate Body decisions, in-
cluding the gathering of relevant facts, the preparation of
written submissions to panels and the Appellate Body, atten-
dance at hearings, the presentation of oral argument to those
presiding over the proceedings and participation in settlement
negotiations .... 41
A report accompanying the Recommendation provides a detailed
analysis of the issue.42 The report argues that: (a) under general princi-
ples of international law, sovereign states are free to choose their
representatives before international organizations, absent specific rules
to the contrary; (b) of all the provisions governing international dispute
settlement tribunals, only Chapter Twenty of the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") limits a member country's choice of
counsel; and that (c) policy concerns regarding private counsel partici-
pation (e.g., confidentiality or conflicts of interest) can be addressed
without excluding private counsel from WTO dispute settlement.
Whether or not private counsel are allowed to participate in all as-
pects of WTO proceedings, private counsel will continue to have a very
significant role as behind-the-scenes advisers to governments. There-
fore, the WTO Members, in cooperation with the relevant professional
organizations, may wish to establish procedures governing the partici-
pation of private lawyers that would address such topics as protection of
confidential information and professional responsibility.
B. Standing to Challenge
Before bringing a challenge under the DSU, does a Member have to
meet a threshold requirement by showing either that the Member has
been harmed by the other Member's practice, or that the Member has a
41. Recommendation 1I8A, adopted at ABA 1998 Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 2, 1998)
(on file with author).
42. "Private Counsel in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings" Report accompanying
Recommendation I18A, supra note 41.
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demonstrable economic interest in the disputed issue? 3 As discussed
below, the DSU does not contain a provision expressly addressing the
question of standing. Yet in the absence of any limitation, there may be
a concern that Members will initiate cases even though they have no
immediate trade interest at stake (e.g., in order to set a legal precedent
for a future proceeding).
In the EC-Bananas case, the EC argued that the United States did
not have a right to challenge the EC's bananas regime. The EC first ar-
gued that the baseline rule of international law was that a claimant must
have a "legal right or interest" in the claim that the claimant is pursuing,
and that nothing in the DSU sets aside this requirement. The EC also
interpreted Article 10.2 of the DSU, which allows a WTO Member that
has "a substantial interest in the matter before a panel" to participate as
a third party, as implying that parties bringing panel proceedings should
have a "legal interest." The EC argued that the United States had no
such interest given the United States' minimal banana production.
44
In response, the Complaining Parties (the United States and other
Members) argued that general international law did not impose a "legal
interest" requirement because Article 3.2 of the DSU encompasses only
customary rules of interpretation of public international law, not sub-
stantive rules of law.4'5 The complaining parties further argued that the
WTO Agreement contained no explicit legal interest requirement, and
that in GATT practice a wide variety of interests could support a claim.
43. Only WTO Members are entitled to bring challenges. See General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (Oct. 30, 1947), 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, as
amended, WTO Agreement Annex IA: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods art.
XXIII (Apr. 15, 1994)("GATT 1994"), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
1338 (1994). Moreover, distinguishing the "right to counsel" of WTO Members, discussed
above, from the right of private parties to participate in dispute resolution is important.
Whatever the merits of private party participation, it is analytically distinct from the question
of whether a WTO Member has the right to be represented by counsel. Cf William D.
Hunter, WTO Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, in THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1994, at 547, 585-87 (1994)
(discussing possibility that private parties would be able to appear in WTO dispute resolution
proceedings). Of interest, in the legislative history of recent U.S. legislation providing funds
for the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the conferees "urge[d] the USTR to
permit participation of non-governmental U.S. persons in the development of U.S. positions
and in the preparation for consultations and dispute settlement proceedings," under appropri-
ate conditions. 143 Cong. Rec. H10845 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 405,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (accompanying H.R. 2267, 106th Cong., Depts. of Commerce,
Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 1998).
44. EC-Bananas (Panel Report), supra note 28, paras. 21-22, 35-36. The ACP third
participants (Belize, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Gre-
nada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal and Suriname) endorsed
the EC position. See EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, paras. 106-107.
45. See EC-Bananas (Panel Report), supra note 28, paras. 2.23-2.25, 2.29-2.34.
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The panel rejected the EC's arguments, holding that the DSU did
not contain any explicit requirement that a Member must have a "legal
interest" to request a panel.4 The panel noted that the United States did
produce bananas in Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and that even if the United
States did not have a potential export interest, the United States' internal
market for bananas could be affected by the EC regime because of the
potential effect on world prices.
After the EC appealed, the Appellate Body affirmed the panel's de-
cision on this issue. The Appellate Body said that it did not agree that
there was any "general rule that in all international litigation, a com-
plaining party must have a 'legal interest' in order to bring a case"47 and
emphasized the need to decide the question of standing by referring to
the terms of the particular international treaty involved. The Appellate
Body then referred to the chapeau of Article XXIII: 1 of the GATT 1994,
which provides:
"If any Member should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agree-
ment is being impeded ....
The Appellate Body interpreted the words "'[i]f any Member
should consider'" as giving Members "broad discretion" to bring a case
against another Member. In support, the Appellate Body also cited DSU
Article 3.7, which states that "[b]efore bringing a case, a Member shall
exercise its judgment as to whether action under these procedures would
be fruitful. ' 49 The Appellate Body stated that these provisions suggest
that "a Member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding
whether any such action would be 'fruitful.' "50
The Appellate Body then pronounced itself satisfied that the United
States was justified in bringing its claims because (a) the United States
was a producer of bananas and therefore had a potential export interest;
(b) the United States' internal market could be affected; and (c) the EC
had not challenged the United States' standing with respect to its claims
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), which the
Appellate Body said were "inextricably interwoven" with the United
States' GATT 1994 claims."
46. Id. para. 7.49.
47. EC-Bananas (Appellate Body) para. 133.
48. EC-Bananas (Appellate Body) para. 134.
49. DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.7.
50. EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, paras. 134-35.
51. Id. paras. 136-37.
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While the Appellate Body ruled for the United States, the Appellate
Body left itself some room to apply a standing limitation should one
become necessary. Thus, the decision states that Members have "broad
discretion" to bring challenges-implying that Members do not have
unlimited discretion-and states that Members are expected to be
"largely self-regulating" in bringing cases-implying that they are not
entirely self-regulating. Indeed, the Appellate Body closed its discussion
by saying that while the Appellate Body was upholding the U.S. right to
bring these claims, this ruling did not mean "that one or more of the
factors [the Appellate Body has] noted in this case would necessarily be
dispositive in another case."5" Thus, in future cases, panels may have
discretion to reject claims brought by Members with little or no stake in
the proceedings, although the parameters of any such standing doctrine
are unclear at this point. 3
Should there be a standing doctrine at the WTO? The answer to this
question depends on whether the purposes of the standing doctrine ap-
ply in the WTO context.-' In the United States, the Supreme Court has
identified three requirements of its standing doctrine: to determine (1)
"whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him
injury in fact, economic or otherwise;" (2) whether the alleged harm is
redressable; and (3) "whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.""
The first requirement derives from Article III of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, which limits the power of federal courts to the resolution of
"cases" and "controversies" in order to avoid judicial involvement in the
resolution of policy issues (i.e., law-making). Requiring that a party
52. Id. para. 138.
53. In this regard, one author states that the standing concept "has found little place in
WTO law:' citing the EC-Bananas panel decision. EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REGULATION § 2.2323 (1995). This statement appears to be accurate for the present,
but the scope of the standing limitation (if any) has not been definitely resolved.
54. Cf Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standards of Re-
view, and Deferences to'National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 208-11 (1996)
(analyzing the proper interpretation of the standard of review provision in the Antidumping
Agreement by considering whether the purposes of standard of review limitations in U.S.
practice are equally applicable in the WTO context).
55. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1970). Commentators have also identified other, unstated, purposes of the standing require-
ment, such as: (1) to avoid deciding issues the court does not want to decide, or believes
should be decided by other branches of government; (2) to make a disguised determination
regarding the substantive merits of the case; or (3) to avoid judicial involvement in cases
where the plaintiff's case has little merit. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 131 (2d ed. 1992).
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show it has been injured by a government action necessarily limits the
role of the courts by restricting parties' ability to bring abstract disputes
before the courts.
The Court has labeled this showing as "injury-in-fact," which en-
sures that the plaintiff has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues....,, In other words, the requirement should re-
sult in a higher quality of judicial decisions because the application of
legal doctrines to particular facts is likely to illuminate the abstract ar-
guments.
These concerns apply in the context of WTO dispute resolution. If
there is no standing requirement at all, there is a risk that panels will be
presented with abstract disputes about the interpretation of particular
W'TO agreements and will not have the benefit of specific facts needed
to determine the correct result. 7 Such abstract rulings could "add to or
diminish the rights and obligations in the covered agreements," violating
DSU Article 3.2." There is certainly an important concern that panels
should not engage in law-making. Article 3.2 of the DSU states that
"[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." How-
ever, it may be that the law-making concern is adequately dealt with by
DSU Article 3.2 and by the fact that panel rulings do not have prece-
dential effect. 9
The "injury-in-fact" requirement is closely related to the second re-
quirement for standing to exist: that is, the harm alleged must be
redressable by the judicial decision.' Redressability also has a parallel
in the WTO context. If the respondent Member does not comply with an
adverse panel ruling, the complaining Member is entitled to compensa-
tion equivalent to the lost trade opportunities.6 But if there was no lost
trade opportunity, how is compensation (or equivalent withdrawal of
concessions) to be established? A respondent Member might have an
56. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). A related concern is to ensure that the
plaintiff will "pursue the litigation vigorously." Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159: 172-73
(1970). This purpose addresses the situation of an insincere plaintiff, who may sue in order
to lose the case and thereby set a favorable precedent. The same concern seems improbable
in the WTO context, where all potential plaintiffs are sovereign governments.
57. This risk was not presented in EC-Bananas. A concrete dispute was arising be-
tween the EC and the Complaining Parties other than the United States.
58. DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.2.
59. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the precedential effect of past panel deci-
sions.
60. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19 (1984).
61. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22.
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incentive in such a case not to comply in the absence of adverse conse-
62
quences.
The third component of the standing inquiry in U.S. practice is the
"zone of interests" inquiry, which derives from the fact that U.S. courts
must interpret whether Congress intended to benefit particular classes of
plaintiffs. This question will probably not pose a concern in WTO dis-
pute resolution. As the panel argued in EC-Bananas, WTO Members
necessarily have an interest in the international trading system and in
other Members' compliance with the rules of the system. 3 As all Mem-
bers are party to the WTO Agreement, they each have a stake in
ensuring that the rules are maintained in good repair. A distinct differ-
ence, therefore, lies between the WTO context and the domestic law
context (at least in the context of the United States), where Congress
may intend that only certain persons are entitled to the protection of a
statute.
In sum, the Appellate Body reached an appropriate result in EC-
Bananas in light of the purposes of a standing requirement, although
perhaps the Appellate Body did not sufficiently justifiy its decision. The
result is that Members are generally free to initiate WTO challenges.
However, in cases where the challenging Member is unable to demon-
strate that it has any particularized interest in the controversy, it is
possible that a panel could refuse to hear the case out of concern that the
case was insufficiently concrete to permit a resolution of the legal is-
sues.
62. For this reason, one author concludes that "it would probably be wise for panels to
continue to require that complaining members demonstrate some personal legal interest by
showing lost trade opportunities." Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
Practice in the Field of Anti-Dumping Law, in Petersmann, supra note 2, at 283, 288. In
some WTO contexts, the substantive violation alleged may itself require such a showing. For
instance, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures requires a showing
of "adverse effects" suffered by the complaining Member in order to establish an actionable
subsidy. WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 5 [hereinafter
SCM Agreement].
63. The Panel stated:
[W]ith the increased interdependence of the global economy, which means that
actions taken in one country are likely to have significant effects on trade and for-
eign direct investment flows in others, Members have a greater stake in enforcing
WTO rules than in the past since any deviation from the negotiated balance of
rights and obligations is more likely than ever to affect them, directly or indirectly.
EC-Bananas (Panel Report), supra note 28, para. 7.50.
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C. Ripeness
The issue of ripeness relates to what sort of impact a government
measure must be having upon the complaining Member before a panel
will rule on the measure's legality." Professor Hudec states that it was
"consistent practice in GATT not to adjudicate the legality of proposed
changes in national law before they are enacted," but that after a na-
tional law's enactment, "the issue has been whether GATI should ever
adjudicate before some definite action is taken affecting the complain-
ant." 65
The concept of ripeness was balanced in GATT jurisprudence by the
established doctrine that the GATT disciplines protected "expectations,"
on which business could rely, and did not merely protect existing trade.
Based on this mandate to protect trade "expectations," one GATT panel
issued a ruling in a situation where the domestic law had apparently not
been applied against any imports," and another panel issued a ruling in a
situation where the domestic law had not yet taken effect.67
A defense on ripeness grounds was raised in the Argentina-
Footwear case.68 In January 1997, the United States requested a WTO
panel to rule on Argentina's import duties on footwear, textiles, apparel,
and other items and argued that these duties were inconsistent with Ar-
gentina's tariff bindings and therefore violated Article II of GATT 1994.
Argentina defended, inter alia, on the ground that the United States had
not shown that any Argentine-imposed import duty actually exceeded its
tariff bindings, and that the mere potential that a duty could exceed the
bound rate did not constitute a violation." In response, the United States
argued that Argentina's import duty scheme "necessarily" had the po-
tential to result in duties above its tariff binding, without any discretion
64. The term "ripeness" is derived from U.S. practice. The U.S. Supreme Court has said
the ripeness doctrine is intended "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative poli-
cies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging par-
ties." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (overruled on other grounds).
65. HUDEC, supra note 4, at 261.
66. See Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, May 15-16, 1984, GATT
B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 94 (1985).
67. See Panel on United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988).
68. WTO Secretariat, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear Textiles, Ap-
parel and Other Items: Report of the Panel, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997) (last downloaded
May 19, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter Argentina-
Footwear (Panel Report)].
69. See Argentina-Footwear (Panel Report), supra note 68, paras. 3.90-3.100.
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being exercised by Argentine customs authorities, so that the Argentine
measure effectively mandated a WTO violation under particular facts. 0
The panel agreed that the Argentine duty scheme was a
"mandatory" measure and stated that "GATT/WTO case law is clear in
that a mandatory measure can be brought before a panel, even if such an
adopted measure is not yet in effect, and independently of the absence
of trade effect for the complaining party.' 71 The panel emphasized that
"'any measure which changes the competitive relationship of Members
nullifies any such Members' benefits under the WTO Agreement.' ,72
The panel concluded that "the competitive relationship of the parties
was changed unilaterally by Argentina because its mandatory measure
clearly has the potential to violate its bindings, thus undermining the
security and predictability of the WTO system."73
The Appellate Body affirmed the result reached by the panel, find-
ing that "there are sufficient reasons to conclude that the [Argentine
measure] will result ... in an infringement of Argentina's obligations." 74
Thus, as long as one can conclude with "sufficient" certainty that a vio-
lation will occur, the measure appears to be actionable.
If cases are considered ripe simply because a measure has the po-
tential to create a violation, is this conclusion tantamount to abandoning
any ripeness requirement? No, although the WTO test is less demanding
than is the ripeness test under U.S. law. Under the WTO, a measure will
not be ripe for review if the Member retains discretion to promulgate or
interpret the law or regulation in a manner consistent with its obliga-
tions-i.e., if the violation is not "mandatory" under any given• 73
circumstances. But as long as a measure will necessarily result in a
70. See id. paras. 3.101-3.105.
71. Id. para. 6.45.
72. Id. (citing EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, para. 252.
73. Id. para. 6.46.
74. WTO Secretariat, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Ap-
parel, and Other Items: Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS56/AB/R, para. 62 [hereinafter
Argentina-Footwear (Appellate Body)].
75. See Argentina-Footwear (Panel Report), supra note 68, para. 6.45 (citing Panel
Report adopted Oct. 4, 1994 re United States-Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal
Sale and Use of Tobacco, DS44/R). In India-Patent Protection, the panel confirmed that a
potential violation (which was not mandatory) was not ripe for review. The United States
argued, inter alia, that India had violated Article 70.9 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") by failing to ensure
that companies that had filed patent applications and received marketing approvals would be
entitled to exclusive marketing rights. WTO Secretariat, India-Patent Protection for Phar-
maceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products: Report of the Panel, WT/DS50/R, para.
4.31 (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter India-Patent Protection]. India argued that the U.S. argu-
ment was not ripe because there was no existing measure that limited the scope of marketing
rights available in this situation, and the DSU "did not permit rulings on potential future
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violation under some circumstances, a Member need not wait for those
circumstances to arise.
This "mandatory measure" doctrine generally makes sense in light
of the purpose of the ripeness doctrine as articulated by the U.S. Su-
preme Court: to ensure "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision.""
The legal issue the claimant Member presents to the panel is arguably fit
for WTO dispute resolution because the Member has effectively made a
final resolution of the legal issue." However, creating an overly inflexi-
ble legal doctrine, so that a mandatory measure must always be
considered ripe, may be inappropriate. The ripeness doctrine serves to
avoid judicial entanglement in abstract issues. While the mandatory na-
ture of the measure is a good indicator that the measure is not too
abstract, situations may arise in which a panel's inability to apply a
WTO provision to a particular set of facts may hamper the panel's re-
view." Therefore, panels should retain some discretion in order to
decline to consider cases where, notwithstanding the mandatory nature
of the measure, the lack of a concrete dispute hamstrings the panel's
review.
D. Mootness
Should panels issue rulings on the merits in cases where the dis-
puted measure has either expired or been withdrawn? As Professor
Hudec wrote of this mootness issue in the GATT7 context, "[t]he reason
for wanting a ruling in such cases is usually the concern that the same
measure will be repeated in the future; ruling after the fact is one of the
only ways GATT can deal with short-term GA1T violations."7 9 A simi-
lar concern has been noted in U.S. law, with the result that the mootness
measures." Id. para. 4.32. Agreeing with India, the panel stated that "[w]e consider a finding
on the nature of the right to be granted under Article 70.9 unnecessary to settle this particular
dispute, which concerns the current non-existence of an exclusive marketing rights system in
India." Id. para. 7.64.
76. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149 (indicating that fitness of the issues and the hardship
of the parties must be considered as a two-fold test).
77. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 696
(D.C. Cir. 1971). The "mandatory measure" doctrine calls attention to the overlap that exists
between the ripeness doctrine and the concept of "finality" under U.S. administrative law,
under which an agency action cannot be reviewed until it is final. In essence, the mandatory
measure doctrine holds that a WTO member's action is ripe because it is effectively final.
78. See id. at 698-99 (finding matter ripe in part because the court was able to restrict
its ruling to a legal issue that is susceptible to resolution in the abstract); Diamond Shamrock
Corp. v. Costal, 580 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding case unripe because judicial
review would be "facilitated by waiting until the administrative policy is implemented for
then a court can be freed, at least in part, from theorizing about how a rule will be applied
and what its effect will be").
79. HUDEC, supra note 4, at 262.
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doctrine will not apply to questions that are "capable of repetition yet
evading review." o
Perhaps based on such concerns, several GATT panels were willing
to rule even after the original measure was withdrawn." United States-
Wine and Grape Products presents a particularly interesting case, com-
bining elements of ripeness and mootness. The United States had
enacted legislation defining the term "industry" in countervailing duty
("CVD") cases to include U.S. grape growers in any case involving wine
and grape products. In January 1985, the EU requested a GAIT panel to
examine whether this provision was consistent with the Subsidies Code
on the ground that the law impermissibly included grape growers within
the "industry" even though they did not produce the like product, wine.
In 1985, the U.S. grape growers filed a CVD petition against EU im-
ports. Before the panel ruled, the U.S. International Trade Commission
("ITC") reached a finding that ended the CVD investigation. The United
States argued that the issue raised by the EU had become "moot" as a
result of the ITC determination because no countervailing duties would
be levied and "the practical basis of the dispute had ended."82
The panel disagreed because its terms of reference were based on
the EU's complaint, which had argued that the U.S. law itself violated
the Subsidies Code. The panel stated that it had "no option but to pro-
ceed with its work, as provided for in its terms of reference, irrespective
of whether any concrete countervailing duty investigation was under
way or whether any countervailing duties based on the above-noted pro-
vision were being or had been levied."83 While the panel framed the
issue in terms of mootness, the decision also demonstrates that a chal-
lenge to a statute may be ripe even where the statute has not been
80. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991).
81. See HUDEC, supra note 4, at 262 (citing Panel on United States-Prohibition of Im-
ports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at
91 (1983); Panel on United States Definition of Industry Concerning Wine and Grape Prod-
ucts [hereinafter United States-Wine and Grape Products], April 28, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D.
(39th Supp.) at 436 (1993); Panel on European Economic Community Restrictions on Im-
ports of Dessert Apples Complaint by Chile, June 22, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at
93 (1990).
82. United States-Wine and Grape Products, supra note 81, para. 3.1.
83. United States-Wine and Grape Products, supra note 81, para.4.1. The United
States did not accept this aspect of the panel's ruling and stated that it "reserved its position
of opposition to the Panel's view that it was ripe for the Panel to consider a matter that did
not involve an actual initiation of an action, but rather an abstract question whether a pro-
ceeding, if initiated, would have been consistent with the Subsidies Code." India-Patent
Protection, supra note 75, para. 4.32 (quoting U.S. statement in United States-Wine and
Grape Products).
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applied if the statute on its face violates a WTO commitment." The
panel presumably would have refused to issue a ruling if the statute had
been repealed because a repealed statute cannot possibly be applied in
future cases.
Several recent panels have already considered the mootness issue. In
United States-Gasoline," Venezuela and Brazil argued that a U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency ("EPA") rule violated the Most-
Favored-Nation ("MFN") obligation of GAT' 1994 Article :1 by dis-
tinguishing among importers based on criteria that had no link to the
imported product.86 The United States argued that the claim was moot
because the rule had expired, and no importer had qualified under the
criteria." The panel declined to rule on the claim and stated that "it had
not been the usual practice of a panel established under the General
Agreement to rule on measures that, at the time the panel's terms of ref-
erence were fixed, were not and would not become effective."88 Because
the panel's terms of reference were established after the EPA rule had
ceased to have any effect, and because the rule was neither specifically
mentioned in the terms of reference nor "likely to be renewed," the
panel did not rule on the claim.
A mootness issue also arose in the WTO proceedings in Argentina-
Footwear. As discussed above, in January 1997 the United States had
requested a panel to address, inter alia, Argentina's import duties on
footwear. On February 14, 1997, Argentina revoked the relevant import
duties on footwear. On February 25, 1997, the DSB established the
panel to consider the "matter" requested by the United States. Argentina
argued, since it had revoked the import duties on footwear, that the U.S.
complaint as to footwear was moot because the measure "was no longer
in effect at the time when the Panel was established."89 Argentina further
argued that ruling on this issue would create a "dangerous" practice of
ruling on hypothetical cases. 90 The United States argued that the issue
was within the panel's terms of reference based on the U.S. request that
84. See discussion supra Part II.C.
85. WTO Secretariat, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline: Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996) (last down-
loaded May 19, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter United
States-Gasoline (Panel Report)].
86. Id. para. 6.18.
87. See id.
88. Id. para. 6.19. For additional discussion of a panel's "terms of reference," see infra
Part III.A.
89. Argentina-Footwear (Panel Report), supra note 68, para. 3.6.
90. Id. para. 3.38.
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previous panels had reviewed measures no longer in effect, and that Ar-
gentina was likely to impose these footwear duties again in the future.9'
The panel held that the U.S. complaint regarding footwear was
moot. While agreeing that several panels had considered measures that
were no longer in force, the panel stated that "in each of those cases...
there was no objection raised by either party to the panel's consideration
of the expired measure." 92 The panel then cited the decision in United
States-Gasoline (discussed above) that usual GAT7 practice was not to
rule on measures that, at the time the panel's terms of reference were
fixed, were not effective and would not become effective. The panel
noted that here, the Argentine measure was revoked before the panel's
"terms of reference were set, i.e. before the Panel started its adjudication
process."93 The panel also cited the Appellate Body's statement in
United States-Wool Shirts that a panel "'need only address those
claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in
the dispute.' ,94 Finally, the panel dismissed the U.S. argument that Ar-
gentina was likely to impose these duties again, saying that the panel
could not "assume" that Argentina would reintroduce the duties.
In Guatemala-Cement,96 the Panel commented in dictum on the is-
sue of mootness in the context of a challenge to the initiation of an
antidumping investigation. In that case, Mexico had raised challenges to
Guatemala's initiation of an investigation, the provisional determination,
and other issues in the conduct of the final investigation. The panel
stated that in a case where the investigating country had not imposed
provisional or final measures (or accepted a price undertaking), then the
complaining country could not pursue WTO dispute settlement "since
the 'matter' about which consultations were held will have become moot
in the absence of one of these actions," given the absence of "ongoing
trade consequences."97 In other words, the panel considered that Mem-
bers are only entitled to rulings on matters that can have some effect in
the particular case about which consultations were held.
91. See id. para. 3.7.
92. Id. para. 6.12.
93. Id. para. 6.19.
94. Id. (citing WTO Secretariat, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India: AB-1997-1, WT/DS33/AB/R (last downloaded May 19,
1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter United States-Wool Shirts
(Appellate Body)]). This issue is discussed infra Part lII.A.2.
95. Id. para. 6.14.
96. WTO Secretariat, Guatemala-Anti-dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Ce-
ment from Mexico: Report of the Panel, WT/DS60/R (June 16, 1998) [hereinafter
Guatemala-Cement].
97. Id. para. 7.17.
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In Japan-Film, the panel stated that the "nullification and impair-
ment" remedy is limited to measures that were being applied at the time
of the decision.9 The panel noted that GATT/WTO precedent was not to
rule on "measures which have expired or which have been repealed or
withdrawn," with the exception of a small number of cases in which the
withdrawn measures had been applied in the very recent past.99 The
panel found that certain measures identified by the United States were
not currently being applied by Japan.
However, in Indonesia-Autos, the panel rejected Indonesia's argu-
ment that its National Car Program had expired and therefore should not
be examined by the panel.' 30 The panel reasoned that this claim was
made by Indonesia after the deadline for submitting information and
arguments; that the complaining parties did not agree that the program
had been terminated; and that in previous GATT/WTO cases panels had
made findings where a measure was terminated or amended after the
panel proceedings began.'0 '
Measures may also be considered even after they have terminated,
where there are continuing trade effects from the previous measures. In
EC-Poultry,2 the panel rejected an argument by the EC that a particu-
lar measure challenged by Brazil had terminated and should not be
considered. The panel reasoned that "Brazil claims that there are certain
lingering effects"-i.e., that the measures affected Brazil's export per-
formance which in turn served as the basis for allocating licenses, and
therefore held that the past measures were not moot.
03
The general approach taken by panels is to find that an issue is moot
if the violation has been terminated by the time the panel's terms of ref-
erence are set, even if the violation still existed at the time of the request
for a panel. While seemingly logical in terms of the DSU text, this ap-
proach risks fostering circumvention of WTO obligations. A Member
could maintain a measure in force until just before a panel was estab-
lished, abolish the measure, and then reimpose the measure after the
98. WTO Secretariat, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper: Report of the Panel, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.57 (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Japan-
Film] (discussing GAIT 1994 Article XXIII: (b)).
99. Id. para. 10.58. The panel cited in the latter category the panel report on United
States-Wool Shirts, where the panel ruled on a measure that was revoked after the interim
review but before issuance of the final report to the parties.
100. Indonesia-Autos, supra note 35, para. 14.9.
101. See id.
102. WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Measures Affecting Importation of
Certain Poultry Products: Report of the Panel, WT/DS69/R (Mar. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
EC-Poultry (Panel Report)].
103. Id. para. 252.
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panel ruling. This suggests that there may be a need for panels to retain
discretion to consider complaints in such cases even where the measure
was not in effect at the time the terms of reference are set.
E. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
The question here is whether an injured party must raise an argu-
ment in the domestic administrative or domestic judicial proceedings in
order for a Member to be able to raise the argument in WTO dispute
settlement-i.e., whether an injured party must exhaust its domestic
remedies before its representative Member may bring an action before
the WTO.' 6 An analogy is to what U.S. administrative lawyers would
refer to as "exhaustion of administrative remedies." This doctrine states
that parties may not raise issues for the first time in judicial appeals if
the parties did not raise the issue before the administrative agency. In
the U.S. administrative law context, the exhaustion doctrine also re-
quires parties to exhaust all available remedies within the administrative
process before a federal court will review the agency's action. °5 In the
WTO context, the exhaustion issue normally arises in challenges to
formal administrative proceedings (e.g. antidumping, countervailing, or
safeguards proceedings), although the exhaustion issue can also arise in
other situations if the challenged Member contends that domestic judi-
cial procedures would have provided an adequate remedy.
The question of "exhaustion of national remedies as a prerequisite
to an international case" raises sensitive political issues, '°  as states may
feel it is inappropriate for a panel to find that a violation exists in situa-
tions where the domestic authorities never had an opportunity to
consider the disputed issue or develop relevant facts. Thus, one U.S.
government lawyer has expressed concern at the prospect that "the
scope of review might not be limited to the facts presented to, and ar-
guments made before, Commerce and the ITC," so that "litigants could
104. Distinguishing between these two aspects of the question is important. In particu-
lar, a Member could be required to raise an issue in any formal domestic proceedings but not
be required to pursue the issue until all administrative and judicial remedies were exhausted.
105. On the narrower question of raising the issue before the agency, see Pierce,
Shapiro & Verkuil, supra note 55, at 179 (referring to the rule that "a party can only raise on
judicial review issues that were properly preserved in the proceedings before the agency by
continuing to raise them at each point in the process where the agency had an opportunity to
consider or to reconsider these issues"). On the broader question of pursuing all potential
administrative remedies, see, for example, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S.
41 (1938); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984). Like the ripeness doctrine, the exhaustion
doctrine theoretically prevents a court from interfering with the administrative process until
the agency has had a chance to act.
106. Croley & Jackson, supra note 54, at 197 n.26.
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be free to introduce new evidence never seen or considered by the agen-
cies."' 07
The DSU does not contain any provision addressing the question of
exhaustion of domestic remedies. With respect to GATI' practice, GATI"
panels had been hostile to any strict requirement of exhaustion of reme-
dies. A GATT 1947 panel rejected such an argument in reviewing an
antidumping decision and stated that "there was nothing in the Agree-
ment [the 1979 GAT Antidumping Agreement] °8 which explicitly
required the exhaustion of administrative remedies, i.e., that for an issue
to be properly before a Panel, it would have had to have been raised in
the domestic administrative proceedings.' '° One author states that
"GAIT and WTO panels have never invoked the widely-used jurisdic-
tional principle that is known as the 'local remedies rule.' (This is the
requirement that before commencing an international claim the injured
party should have exhausted all potential remedies in the country re-
sponsible for the alleged breach of international law.)" 10 He also states
that "the approach seems unlikely to change under the WTO." I'I
However, the exhaustion concept did apply to a certain extent in
GATT practice. For instance, the panel in Mexico-Cement limited its
examination to the facts in the administrative record so that the com-
plaining Member could not submit new evidence to the panel that had
not been before the administrative agency."' Moreover, GAYT 1947
panels recognized that the failure to raise an argument before a national
authority might affect the merits of the argument before the panel." 3 For
107. Hunter, supra note 43, at 558; see also Timothy M. Reif, Coming of Age in Ge-
neva: Guiding the GA7T Dispute Settlement System on Review of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1185, 1193-96 (1993). On
the other hand, the opposite concern is that the parties in an antidumping proceeding are the
private foreign producers, while "at the WTO panel the government is the party and the gov-
ernment may not have had any realistic chance to present facts at the national level." Croley
& Jackson, supra note 54, at 200 n.32. Moreover, at least in the United States, administrative
agencies are required to follow U.S. law, rather than WTO rules, to the extent U.S. law is
inconsistent with the WTO. See 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1994); Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667-68 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
108. See GATT Secretariat, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Antidumping Agreement].
109. Panel Report of Sept. 7, 1992 re United States-Anti-dumping Duties on Gray
Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, ADP/82, para. 5.9 (unadopted)
[hereinafter Mexico-Cement].
110. McGovern, supra note 53, § 2.2324.
111. Id.; see also Petersmann, supra note 2, at 116-19 (arguing against a requirement
of prior exhaustion of local remedies).
112. Mexico-Cement, supra note 109, para. 5.12.
113. See Panel Report of Nov. 30, 1992 re United States-Imposition of Antidumping
Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, paras. 347-
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instance, an exporting country might challenge a countervailing duty
determination on the ground that the importing country had failed to
justify its determination on a particular issue. If the exporters failed to
raise this issue in the national investigation, a panel might consider this
failure as excusing the lack of an extended discussion of the issue in the
importing country's determination."4
An exhaustion issue has arisen in one WTO panel decision thus far.
In Argentina-Footwear, the panel rejected an argument that there was
no violation of Argentina's VTO tariff binding because the importers
had failed to exhaust their domestic remedies. Argentina argued that its
duty scheme was acceptable because under its Constitution, interna-
tional law was supreme to domestic law, so that an importer who was
required to pay a duty above Argentina's WTO tariff binding would
"ha[ve] access to a domestic mechanism to challenge such customs de-
termination[s]." ' " The panel rejected this argument and stated that
Members are obliged to comply with their WTO obligations uncondi-
tionally, "regardless of whether that Member provides a remedy for such
violation in its domestic legal system." " ' The panel said that the "delay
and uncertainty" resulting from Argentina's suggested approach would
be inconsistent with the WTO goal of providing predictability and secu-
rity for international trade."' No WTO panel has yet addressed the
narrower issue of whether an issue must at least be raised in any domes-
tic administrative proceedings to permit a WTO challenge.
Should there be a doctrine of exhaustion in WTO proceedings? One
author argues that public international law (applicable in WTO pro-
ceedings pursuant to DSU Article 3.2) requires exhaustion of remedies
419 (unadopted); Panel Report of Dec. 4, 1992 re United States-Imposition of Countervail-
ing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, SCM/153, paras.
218; Panel Report of October 31, 1994 re United States-Imposition of Countervailing Du-
ties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom, SCM/185, para. 640 (unadopted) [hereinafter United
States-Lead and Bismuth Steel]; Panel Report of Aug. 20, 1990 re United States-
Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Seamless Stainless Steel Hollow Products from Sweden,
ADP/47 (unadopted).
114. For instance, in United States-Lead and Bismuth Steel, supra note 113, the EC
argued that the U.S. Commerce Department had failed to give reasons for its rejection of
arguments against a particular methodology for amortizing capital subsidies over time in a
countervailing duty case. The panel found that the Commerce Department "was not pre-
sented with any arguments or information calling into question the reasonableness" of the
methodology, and found that the Commerce Department therefore had not violated any obli-
gation to give reasons for its decision. United States-Lead and Bismuth Steel, supra note 113,
para. 640.
115. Argentina-Footwear (Panel Report), supra note 68, para. 6.42.
116. Id. para. 6.68.
117. Id.
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in situations involving a national of the complaining Member."g Based
on this approach, he argues that the GATT's rejection of the exhaustion
concept was justified because "the object of the [GAT] obligations are
not private parties but goods," but that exhaustion should be required in
certain WTO contexts that involve legal obligations whose purpose is to
protect private parties-obligations such as those found in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agree-
ment")."9
This distinction appears to be rather unworkable and lacking in
foundation. While the GAT 1947 obligations did relate to the treatment
of goods, many obligations were drafted in terms of the rights of a pri-
vate party. For instance, in Mexico-Cement, the 1979 Antidumping
Agreement contained several articles along these lines.2 It is unclear
whether it is possible to categorize GATT or WTO obligations as relat-
ing to the treatment of goods or the treatment of private parties in a
easily ascertainable manner. Equally important, it seems quite unlikely
that the Uruguay Round negotiators intended to draw such a sharp dis-
tinction between agreements (e.g., GATS and TRIPS) where exhaustion
would be required and other agreements where it would not, without
making any express reference to this distinction.
A better approach to the exhaustion issue may be to build on the
existing GATT and WTO practice in this area. As in the Argentina-
Footwear case, WTO panels should not require that the national of the
complaining Member has pursued all judicial appeals in the country
involved, as such a process could take many years.121
A somewhat more difficult issue is whether WTO panels should re-
quire that any argument raised by a Member in the proceeding must be
raised in formal proceedings below (e.g., antidumping, countervailing
duty or safeguard proceedings). With respect to legal issues (i.e., con-
sistency with WTO obligations), requiring an issue to be raised below
seems inappropriate, particularly because domestic administrative agen-
cies often are obliged to follow domestic law even where this is
118. See R. S. J. Martha, World Trade Disputes Settlement and the Exhaustion of Local
Remedies Rule, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1996, at 107, 109.
119. See id. at 110, 119-21.
120. See 1979 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 108, arts. 6.1, 6.2, 6.6 and 6.7.
121. For instance, in one U.S. countervailing duty case, Final Affirmative Countervail-
ing Duty Determination: Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products from
the United Kingdom, [1993] 58 Fed. Reg. No. 10 at 6237, an investigation initiated in 1992
still awaits final judicial resolution from the U.S. courts as of this writing in mid-1998. If the
GATT panel that considered this case (the United States-Lead and Bismuth Steel panel) had
required the complaining party to await judicial resolution, the party would still be waiting.
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inconsistent with WTO obligations."' In addition, to the extent that little
or no deference is due to a Member's legal interpretation of its WTO
obligations, requiring exhaustion would be inappropriate because the
panel is considered as competent as the domestic authority (perhaps
more so) to resolve the meaning of the WTO commitments.'23 This ap-
proach is consistent with Mexico-Cement. However, consistent with
the GATT panel decisions discussed earlier, WTO panels may consider
the failure to make an argument below as relevant to the merits of par-
ticular complaints, particularly cdmplaints regarding the absence of a
reasoned explanation on an issue that was not raised below.
Finally, with respect to evidentiary/factual issues, complaining
Members should not be able to introduce new evidence in the dispute
settlement context for substantive consideration by the panel in appeals
from domestic administrative proceedings. These administrative pro-
ceedings are "on-the-record" proceedings and a WTO panel is ill-
equipped to engage in fact-finding. This approach is consistent with the
GATT panel decision in Mexico-Cement. However, a complaining
Member should be able to use evidence that the complaining member
tried to submit at the administrative proceedings, if only for the limited
purpose of supporting a claim that the other Member refused to consider
relevant evidence.
III. ISSUES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE PANEL PROCEEDINGS
We now turn to issues that arise once the panel has resolved pre-
liminary issues and has agreed to hear the case. What issues are
properly before the panel? Must the panel decide all issues presented to
it? What standard of review should the panel apply to national deci-
sions? What is the role of precedent in panel decisions, if any? Is there a
burden of proof, and if so, who has it? And can the panel engage in dis-
covery of new facts? Each of these questions has presented WTO panels
with important issues for decision, and the decisions in turn are likely to
have an important impact on future WTO litigation.
122. See generally Reif, supra note 107.
123. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 53, at 208 ("That GATT/WTO members have
superior information to GATr/WTO panels about the meaning or ultimate aim of the Agree-
ment's provisions seems implausible"). The same distinction between factual and legal
arguments also applies in the U.S. context of judicial review of agency decisions. See
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 407 (1993) ("where
the issue is legal, perhaps a matter of construing statutory language, the courts are more
confident of their skills and not as likely to require exhaustion") (citing McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969)).
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A. Panel Terms of Reference
1. Scope of Panel Review
The issue before the panel is determined by the complaining Mem-
ber's request that a panel be formed to rule on a particular matter. 24
From a textual standpoint, this is referred to as the panel's "terms of
reference." Article 7.1 of the DSU states that unless the parties other-
wise agree, a panel's terms of reference are:
to examine, in light of the relevant provisions in (name of cov-
ered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter
referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document... and to
make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the rec-
ommendations or giving the rulings provided for in that/those
agreement(s).'"
Because the panel's terms of reference are restricted to the "matter"
referred to the DSB by the complaining Member, it is possible that a
panel will be precluded from considering a particular claim because it
has not been stated specifically in the complaining Member's request for
a panel. Indeed, DSU Article 6.2 expressly requires that a request for a
panel "identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief sum-
mary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the
problem clearly." 126 This provision also serves an important due process
function of informing the other Member, as well as third parties who
may wish to participate in the panel proceedings, regarding the nature of
the precise claims at issue.
2
1
124. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 7. As one author notes, Article 7 allows the com-
plaining Member to "unilaterally define[] the subject-matter of litigation." Pierre Pescatore,
Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT
DisPuTE SETTLEMENT 3, 24 (Pierre Pescatore et al., eds. 1997). This may give the com-
plaining Member a significant advantage in the litigation, insofar as the Member is able to
frame the terms of the panel's consideration of the issue.
125. DSU, supra note 5, art. 7.1.
126. Id. art. 6.2.
127. See WTO Secretariat, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desicated Coconut: AB-1996-4,
WT/DS22/AB/R, at 22 (last downloaded July 28, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/
bullitinl.htm> [hereinafter Brazil-Desiccated Coconut (Appellate Body)], where the Ap-
pellate Body stated that:
A panel's terms of reference are important for two reasons. First, terms of refer-
ence fulfill an important due process objective-they give the parties and third
parties sufficient information concerning the claims at issue in the dispute in order
to allow them an opportunity to respond to the complainant's case. Second, they
establish the jurisdiction of the panel by defining the precise claims at issue in the
dispute.
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In EC-Bananas, the EC contended that the request did not meet the
requirements of Article 6.2 because the request simply listed the meas-
ures involved and listed the provisions of the agreements allegedly
violated without providing an argument as to which aspects of the EC
measures violated specific provisions of the agreements.12
The panel took a flexible approach to this issue. The panel first dis-
cussed the "ordinary meaning" of the DSU's terms and found that if a
panel request were to "identify a measure and specify the provision with
which it is alleged to be inconsistent," it would be "at the outer limits of
what is acceptable under Article 6.2." 129 However, the panel rejected the
claims based on the "Agreement on Agriculture" and "other" WTO
agreements, because "[iun these two situations, it is not possible at the
panel request stage, even in the broadest generic terms, to describe what
legal 'problem' is asserted." "3 The panel went on to support its decision
by, inter alia, finding that even if there were some uncertainty as to
whether the panel request conformed to DSU Article 6.2, "the first
written submission of the Complainants 'cured' that uncertainty because
their submissions were sufficiently detailed to present all the factual and
legal issues clearly." 131
The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's decision that the request
met the minimum requirements of Article 6.2. However, the Appellate
Body emphasized that this issue must be resolved on the face of the re-
quest. The Appellate Body rejected the panel's suggestion that
subsequent submissions by the complaining party could "cure" any de-
ficiency in a request.' This is an interesting example compared with the
U.S. civil procedure model of allowing plaintiffs to cure any deficien-
cies in their complaint by allowing liberal amendment of complaints. "3
While this result may have been required by the text of the DSU, it is
unclear what purpose is served thereby because complaining Members
could refile their request for a panel in response to the panel's ruling.'4
128. EC-Bananas (Panel Report), supra note 28, para. 2.8.
129. Id. para. 7.29.
130. Id. para. 7.30.
131. Id. para. 7.44.
132. See EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, paras. 141-43. The Appellate
Body suggested that "this kind of issue could be decided early in panel proceedings, without
causing prejudice or unfairness to any party or third party, if panels had detailed, standard
working procedures that allowed, inter alia, for preliminary rulings." Id. para. 144. See also
United States-Denial of Most-Favored Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear from
Brazil: Report of the Panel, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 128 para. 6.2
(1993) (jurisdictional issue was resolved in a preliminary decision).
133. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
134. See McGovern, supra note 53, at § 2.2323 (arguing that the DSU requirement for
the prompt settlement of disputes "would be frustrated if the complainant Member was
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Nonetheless, this problem is unlikely to arise very often, given the
rather minimal requirements for specificity that are imposed on re-
quests.
In India-Patent Protection, the panel had to decide whether a com-
plaining Member should be allowed to raise a new claim in response to
a defense raised by the defending Member. The United States had com-
plained, inter alia, that India had violated Article 70.8 of the TRIPS
Agreement by failing to put in place provisions for the filing of patent
applications, known as a "'mailbox system.' """ In its first submission,
India argued that it did have in place such a mailbox system. In re-
sponse, the United States argued that if India did have a mailbox system,
India had violated Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement (a transparency
requirement) by failing to make that system known to other Members.
India asked the panel to exclude this claim because the claim was not
contained in the U.S. request or in its first written submission.'36
The panel rejected India's request to exclude the claim. First, the
panel interpreted DSU Article 6.2, which requires that the panel request
contain a "'brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient
to present the problem clearly.' ""3 The panel found that the "problem"
should be construed broadly to refer to India's failure to implement an
adequate mailbox system, so that the United States had presented the
"problem" in the request even though the United States had not referred
to the transparency problem or to Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement. 3
In this regard, the panel's ruling appears flawed. If Members are
allowed to introduce new claims simply because they relate to the same
general "problem" as described in the panel request, other Members
obliged to hold back the inadequately-disclosed claims until further dispute proceedings
could be launched").
135. India-Patent Protection (Panel Report), supra note 75, at 5 n.4. Under the TRIPS
Agreement, developing countries are not required to make patent protection available for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products until ten years after the WTO's entry into
force. However, if a developing country elects not to do so, it is required to provide a means
for filing applications for patents for such inventions in the interim period. See TRIPS
Agreement, Annex IC, art. 70.8(a), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, at 1621, 1652.
136. See India-Patent Protection (Panel Report), supra note 75, para. 7.7. India also
asked the panel to exclude the U.S. request for a panel suggestion as to how India should
implement the panel's ruling. The panel rejected India's argument, finding that a request
regarding implementation "is not sensu stricto a legal claim. It is simply a request for the
Panel to exercise its discretionary authority under Article 19.1, second sentence of the DSU."
Id. para. 7.16. Thus, the panel appears to have held that Article 6.2 does not apply to requests
regarding implementation.
137. Id. para. 7.11 (citation omitted)..
138. Id. Furthermore, the panel's decision appears inconsistent with the Appellate
Body's holding in EC-Bananas (Appellate Body) that panel requests must list the particular
provisions of WTO agreements allegedly violated; see discussion supra accompanying notes
128-132. A discussion of the "problem" does not appear to meet this requirement.
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(including third participants who are considering intervention) may not
receive adequate notice of the arguments that will be raised. The panel
recognized this problem,3 9 but argued that "the panel process is a dy-
namic one where claims by the parties become refined and elaborated
through arguments and counter-arguments."'4o However, this argument
was based on a citation to the EC-Bananas panel's decision to allow
the "cure" of omitted arguments at a later stage, which, as discussed
above, was reversed by the Appellate Body.'4' The panel also noted that
third parties can make submissions to the Appellate Body on issues of
which they did not have notice. However, this argument assumes that the
case is appealed to the Appellate Body. Moreover, saying that other
DSU provisions may also protect such interests is not a satisfactory an-
swer to the problem of undermining Article 6.2's protection of third
party interests.
Second, the panel pointed out that the United States had not raised
its Article 63 claim in its request or in its first submission because the
United States had no reason to believe that India had a mailbox system
in place. 4 1 In other words, the United States was making a "direct re-
sponse" to India's rebuttal to the original U.S. argument, and the claim
was therefore within the panel's terms of reference.143 While under-
standable in the circumstances of the case, this legal theory appears so
broad as to permit end-runs around the terms of Article 6.2. If com-
plaining Members are allowed to introduce new claims as long as the
claims are a "direct response" to the other Member's arguments, the ex-
ception to Article 6.2 could swallow the rule.
The Appellate Body reversed the panel's decision to allow the U.S.
claim under Article 63.'" The Appellate Body held that the DSU does
not allow a panel to consider any claims that are outside the panel's
terms of reference, and that the Article 63 claim was outside the panel's
terms of reference because the United States had not referred to Article
63 in the request for a panel. Citing its decision in EC-Bananas, the
Appellate Body noted that the United States had failed to identify a spe-
cific provision of an agreement that is alleged to have been violated, and
therefore the United States' request did not meet the "'minimum stan-
139. See id. paras. 7.13-7.14.
140. Id. para. 7.13.
141. See text supra at notes 131-134.
142. See id. para. 7.12.
143. Id. para7.15.
144. See WTO Secretariat, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R, at paras. 85-96
(Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter India-Patent Protection (Appellate Body)].
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dards"' set out in EC-Bananas.'45 While acknowledging the argument
that the United States had no reason to know India would assert it had a
mailbox system in place, the Appellate Body found no basis in the DSU
for allowing claims outside the scope of a panel's terms of reference, for
146
any reason.
The Appellate Body's decision appears to work some injustice in
the circumstances of this case, for the sake of establishing a bright-line
rule that panels are bound strictly by their terms of reference. Perhaps
recognizing this and seeking to avoid future problems of this kind, the
Appellate Body concluded its decision by enjoining Members to coop-
erate in disclosing claims and facts:
All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must
be fully forthcoming from the very beginning both as to the
claims involved in a dispute and as to the facts relating to those
claims. Claims must be stated clearly. Facts must be disclosed
freely. This must be so in consultations as well as in the more
formal setting of panel proceedings. In fact, the demands of due
process that are implicit in the DSU make this especially neces-
sary during consultations. For the claims that are made and the
facts that are established during consultations do much to shape
the substance and the scope of subsequent panel proceedings. 47
Put less diplomatically, if India had disclosed during consultation
India's factual assertion regarding the mailbox system, then the United
States would have been able to include the Article 63 claim in the re-
quest for a panel and the difficult issue would have been avoided.
While EC-Bananas and India-Patent Protection provide the
most in-depth treatment of this issue, several other WTO panels have
also addressed the scope of their terms of reference. 4 In Japan-
145. See id. para. 91.
146. See id., para. 93.
147. See id. para. 94.
148. See WTO Secretariat, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut: Report of
the Panel, WT/DS22/R (Oct. 17, 1996) (last downloaded July 28, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter Brazil-Desiccated Coconut (Panel
Report)], the panel ruled that the Philippines was not entitled to a ruling on its complaint that
Brazil had refused to hold consultations because the Philippines had not adequately raised
this issue in the request for the establishment of a panel. See id. paras. 286-90. In reaching
this ruling, the panel described the standard as whether it was "possible, based on a reason-
able reading of the documents determining the scope of the terms of reference, to conclude
that this Panel would be asked to make findings regarding Brazil's failure to consult." Id.
para. 289. See also WTO Secretariat, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA, paras. XXIV-XXVI (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Beef
Hormones (Panel Report)] (refusing to consider two U.S. claims because one claim was not
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Film, 49 the panel addressed Japan's arguments that certain measures
were outside the scope of the U.S. request for the panel. The panel
stated that when particular measures are not specifically identified in the
panel request, they could still be considered under certain conditions:
To fall within the terms of Article 6.2, it seems clear that a
"measure" not explicitly described in a panel request must have
a clear relationship to a "measure" that is specifically described
therein, so that it can be said to be "included" in the specified
"Measure". In our view, the requirements of Article 6.2 would
be met in the case of a "measure" that is subsidiary or so closely
related to a "measure" specifically identified, that the respond-
ing party can reasonable be found to have received adequate
notice of the scope of the claims asserted by the complaining
party. The two key elements--close relationship and notice-
are inter-related: only if a "measure" is subsidiary or closely
related to a specifically identified "measure" will notice be ade-
quate. For example, we consider that where a basic framework
law dealing with a narrow subject matter that provides for im-
plementing "measures" is specified in a panel request,
implementing "measures" might be considered in appropriate
circumstances as effectively included in the panel request as
well for purposes of Article 6.2."0
included in the U.S. request and the United States had failed to "raise specific arguments or
submit factual or scientific evidence" on the other claim); WTO Secretariat, European Com-
munities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS67/R,
WT/DS68/R, paras. 8.8-8.11 (Feb. 5, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Computer Equipment (Panel
Report)] (rejecting an EC argument that certain products were outside the scope of the U.S.
request for establishment of a panel); see also id. at paras. 8.13-8.14 (rejecting a U.S. re-
quest that the panel consider an EC regulation issued after the establishment of the panel,
because "[i]t has been the consistent practice of previous panels not to examine measures
introduced after the establishment of the panels"); see also WTO Secretariat, European
Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment: Report of the Ap-
pellate Body, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R (Feb. 5, 1998) [hereinafter EC-
Computer Equipment (Appellate Body)], paras. 58-73 (finding that the U.S. request for the
establishment of a panel was consistent with DSU art. 6.2); WTO Secretariat, Australia-
Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon: Report of the Panel, WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Australia-Salmon], para. 8.28 (holding that Canada's claim of nullification and
impairment under Article XXIII:I(b) of GATT 1994 was outside of the panel's terms of ref-
erence because Canada had not mentioned Article XXIII in its request for a panel);
Indonesia-Autos, supra note 35, para. 14.3 (ruling that U.S. claims regarding a particular
loan were not within the panel's terms of reference because the loan had not yet been made
at the time of the U.S. request for a panel and the measure identified by the United States did
not include the loan).
149. See generally Japan-Film, supra note 98.
150. Id. para 10.8. The panel cited the Appellate Body decision in EC-Bananas as
authority as well as several GATT and WTO panel decisions. Id. paras. 10.10-11.
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Based on this reasoning, the panel decided that certain measures
were not properly before the panel as they were not subsidiary or
closely related to a "measure" specified in the U.S. panel request.
2. Judicial Economy
Another issue is whether a WTO panel should refuse to decide is-
sues that do not have to be decided in order to dispose of the dispute, for
reasons of judicial economy. According to Professor Hudec, the normal
practice of GAT[ panels was to decline to decide such unnecessary is-
sues.' However, he states that panels did depart from this rule where a
broader ruling would serve some purpose, such as providing guidance
on the panel's view of the meaning of an important GATT provision."
In United States-Wool Shirts, India argued that Article 11 of the
DSU entitled India to a finding on each of the issues raised. The panel
disagreed and cited "the consistent GATi' panel practice of judicial
economy." '53 The panel stated: "if we judge that the specific matter in
dispute can be resolved by addressing only some of the arguments
raised by the complaining party, we can do so." ,4
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision. The Appellate
Body stated that neither DSU Article 11, nor previous GATT practice,
requires a panel to examine all legal claims made by the complaining
party. The Appellate Body declared that previous GATT 1947 and WTO
panels have "frequently addressed only those issues that such panels
considered necessary for the resolution of the matter between the par-
ties, and have declined to decide other issues." ,5 While the Appellate
151. See HUDEC, supra note 4, at 262 ("If a measure is found to be GATT-illegal and
must be removed in its entirety, panels will normally not decide whether the measure is also
discriminatory, or whether it is also illegal under some other rule"). One such instance is
Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt: Report of the Panel, Dec. 5, 1989,
GAlT" B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 68 (1990) (declining to rule on whether products were
"perishable" under Article XI:2(c), on the ground that decision of the issue was not neces-
sary given the panel's rulings that the Canadian restrictions violated Article XI for other
reasons). See also United States-Wool Shirts (Appellate Body) at 19 n.27 (collecting deci-
sions).
152. See HUDEC, supra note 4, at 262-63 (citing Japan-Restrictions on Imports of
Certain Agricultural Products: Report of the Panel, March 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th
Supp.) at 163 (1989); United States-Customs User Fee: Report of the Panel, Feb. 2, 1988,
GAT'T B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 245 (1989)); United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930: Report of the Panel, Nov. 7, 1989, GATIT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990).
153. WTO Secretariat, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts
and Blouses from India: Report of the Panel, WT/DS33/R, para. 6.6 (last downloaded May
20, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter United States-Wool
Shirts (Panel Report)].
154. Id.
155. United States-Wool Shirts (Appellate Body), supra note 94, at 19.
1231Summer 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Body acknowledged that "a few GATT 1947 and WTO panels did make
broader rulings," it said that nothing in the DSU requires panels to do
so. Instead, the Appellate Body said, "[a] panel need only address those
claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in
the dispute." '"6
Thus, after Wool Shirts, panels are allowed to address issues that are
not strictly necessary to resolving the dispute, but are not required to do
so."" This result may be questioned on legal and policy grounds. First,
DSU Article 7.2 states that panels "shall address the relevant provisions
in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dis-
pute." ' The Appellate Body did not address Article 7.2 in Wool Shirts,
even though India referred to Article 7 in its appeal of this issue.5 9 And,
as Professor McGovern argues, if the Appellate Body were to reverse
the panel's decision on the issue that the panel deemed decisive, "further
progress on the remaining claims might be difficult in the absence of
findings by the panel." "o As discussed in Section V.B., infra, the Ap-
pellate Body lacks authority to make factual findings on matters not
addressed by the panel and lacks authority to remand to the panel for
further findings. Therefore, if a panel refuses to address certain claims
legitimately presented to it, this refusal creates a real risk that those
claims could never be addressed (absent a new proceeding). For these
reasons, the practice of judicial economy seems to have rather troubling
implications. 6
In fact, panels have already begun to anticipate this problem. In In-
dia-Patent Protection, India argued that the panel should not address
the United States' argument regarding the non-transparency of India's
156. Id. at 20. See also United States-Gasoline (Panel Report), supra note 85, para.
6.43 (concluding that it was not necessary to decide whether the U.S. measures violated the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in view of the panel's findings that the U.S.
measures violated Article 111:4 of GATT 1994).
157. See Guatemala-Cement, supra note 96, n. 219 and para. 7.29; Australia -
Salmon, supra note 151, para. 8.185 (declining to consider whether Australia's measure
violated GATT 1994 art. XI, after finding that the measure was inconsistent with the SPS
Agreement); United States-Shrimp, supra note 3, paras. 22-23 (declining to consider
claims under Article XII and Article I of the GAlT 1994, after finding that the U.S. measure
was inconsistent with Article XI).
158. DSU, supra note 5, art. 7.2.
159. See United States-Wool Shirts (Appellate Body), supra note 94, at 6.
160. McGovern, supra note 53, § 2.2321.
161. One also may wonder whether the same rule of "judicial economy" applies to the
Appellate Body. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 17.12 (requiring Appellate Body to "address
each of the issues raised during the appellate proceedings"); see also Donald M. McRae, The
Emerging Appellate Jurisdiction in International Trade Law, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
WTO 98, 107 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1988).
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mailbox patent system because the United States had requested a ruling
on this issue only if the panel were to find that India had a valid mailbox
system in place.' India said that the "purpose of the WTO dispute set-
tlement procedure was not to generate interpretations that were not
required to resolve the dispute." '63 The panel rejected this argument,
stating that:
in view of the Appellate Body's observation on the limitation of
its mandate under Articles 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU in its re-
cent report on the Periodicals case, the Panel felt all the more
strongly the need to avoid a legal vacuum in the event that, upon
appeal, the Appellate Body were to reverse the Panel's findings
on Article 70.8, [relating to the substantive U.S. claim]."'
However, another recent panel refused to issue rulings on claims on
the ground that the rulings were not necessary given the panel's finding
of a separate violation.
65
B. Standard of Review
The "standard of review" issue is whether a WTO panel should
make a strictly objective determination of whether a Member's action is
consistent with its WTO obligations, or whether a WTO panel should
grant some deference to the factual findings and interpretations of WTO
obligations made by a Member in the course of deciding to take the
challenged action.'" If some deference is granted, then questions arise
as to how much deference is appropriate, and whether different levels of
deference are appropriate for different contexts, particularly for ques-
tions of fact versus questions of law.
There are two provisions of the WTO Agreements that are particu-
larly relevant to the standard of review issue. The DSU contains a
162. India-Patent Protection, supra note 75, para. 6.6.
163. Id. para. 6.9.
164. Id. para. 6.11 (footnote omitted). This aspect of the Periodicals case cited is dis-
cussed infra Section V.B.
165. See EC-Computer Equipment (Panel Report), supra note 148, para. 8.72 (holding
that since the panel had found a violation of Article 11:1 of GATT 1994 by the EC with re-
spect to certain computer equipment, it was not necessary to rule on whether the United
Kingdom or Ireland had violated Article II:1 as well).
166. A separate "standard of review" issue arises with respect to Appellate Body review
of panel decisions. See infra Part V.C. Also, antidumping decisions are subject to a specific
standard of review. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 807 (1994)
art. 17.6 [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement]. See generally Croley & Jackson, supra note
54; see also McGovern, supra note 53, §§ 12.141, 12.143.
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provision with general applicability to the standard of review to be ap-
plied in panel decisions.6 7 Article 11 of the DSU states that:
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its re-
sponsibilities under this Understanding and the covered
agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective as-
sessment of the matter before it, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make
such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the rec-
ommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the
covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the
parties to the disputes and give them adequate opportunity to
develop a mutually satisfactory solution.'"
The terms of Article 11 raises a question whether panels should be
influenced by the challenged Member's determinations on questions of
either fact or law because a panel must make an "objective assessment" as
to both "the facts of the case," i.e., factual issues, and the "applicability of
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements," i.e., legal issues.
The requirement of an "objective assessment" arguably would not per-
mit a panel to alter the factual or legal determinations that the panel
would have reached independently solely because the Member whose
action is challenged has made certain factual or legal determinations.
The standard of review provision in the WTO Antidumping Agree-
ment ' could support this interpretation of Article 11 by inference.
Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement provides that:
In examining the matter in paragraph 5 [i.e., the claim of viola-
tion]:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall
determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was
proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion,
the evaluation shall not be overturned;
167. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 11; see also United States-Wool Shirts (Panel Re-
port), supra note 153, para. 7.16 (stating that "although the DSU does not contain any
specific references to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which
describes the parameters of the functions of panels, is relevant here ... .
168. DSU, supra note 5, art. 11.
169. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 166.
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(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpreta-
tion of public international law. Where the panel finds that a
relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities'
measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests
upon one of those permissible interpretations.7 0
Under Article 17.6, panels are required to grant significant defer-
ence to national authorities' establishment of the facts, deferring to
factual findings as long as the findings were unbiased and objective, and
are required to defer to national authorities' legal interpretation of the
Antidumping Agreement as long as that interpretation is within the
range of "permissible" interpretations. The Guatemala-Cement deci-
sion was the first WTO decision to apply the standard of review set forth
tin the Antidumping Agreement. The panel interpreted this standard of
review as requiring it to examine "whether an unbiased and objective
investigating authority evaluating that evidence could properly have de-
termined that sufficient evidence of dumping and causal link existed to
justify initiating the investigation."'71 The panel then held that Guate-
mala's decision was not supported by sufficient evidence for an objective
body to initiate an investigation.'
By requiring such deference in the context of review of anti-
dumping determinations, but not in the context of other national
decisions, the negotiators may have intended to instruct panels to ap-
ply a less deferential standard in the context of other national
decisions. A Ministerial Decision, adopted April 15, 1994, states that
the Antidumping Agreement standard of review "shall be reviewed
after a period of three years with a view to considering the question of
whether it is capable of general application." 17 This Decision makes
clear that the standard does not currently have "general application."
170. Id. art. 17.6.
171. Guatemala-Cement, supra note 96, para. 7.57.
172. See id. para. 7.67.
173. Decision on Review of Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Arti-
cle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Uruguay Round
Ministerial Decisions and Declarations.
174. Whether the Antidumping Agreement standard of review also applies in the coun-
tervailing duty context is unclear. A Ministerial Decision calls for "consistent resolution" of
appeals from antidumping and countervailing duty decisions. See Declaration on Dispute
Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures. The United States interprets this Ministerial Decision as meaning that the
same standard of review applies in both contexts. See Statement of Administrative Action to
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Moreover, applying the Antidumping Agreement's standard of review
in other contexts appears inconsistent with Article 1 l's requirement that
panels make an "objective assessment" of the merits on both factual and
legal issues.'
If national decisions outside the antidumping context should receive
less deference than antidumping decisions, an important question would
arise as to how much deference is due. It is important to distinguish
among three aspects of national decisions: the "raw" evidence that is the
subject of the national determination; the factual conclusions drawn from
that evidence; and whether the Member's action conforms to its WTO
obligations.
Regarding the first aspect-i.e., the facts on which the national
agency relied-it is useful to distinguish further between "on-the-
record" proceedings and other proceedings. In proceedings that take
place on an administrative record, the national proceedings have estab-
lished the "facts of the case" under DSU Article 11. Therefore, the panel
may not allow a complaining Member to introduce new facts at this
stage, but is limited to assessing the existing "facts of the case." How-
ever, in proceedings that are not on-the-record, the facts of the case have
not been established and the panel inevitably will have to make factual
findings in the first instance as part of its "objective assessment."
The second aspect relates to the panel's review of the Member's
factual conclusions based on the evidence. This is probably the most
difficult issue in the standard of review context. The difficulty is that the
terms of Article 11 appear at odds with the deference that appears ap-
propriate from a policy perspective. If panels are required to perform an
"objective assessment" of the facts, how can the panel grant deference
to the Member's factual conclusions? Deference appears appropriate,
for instance, in the context of adjudicative, on-the-record proceedings,
such as countervailing duty proceedings, or safeguard proceedings, or
even in the context of a national rulemaking. The agency involved has
developed substantial expertise in the area, which the panel cannot
match given its limitations of resources and time. A possible solution to
this dilemma is to allow panels to vary their interpretation of what is
required by the term "objective assessment," depending on the particular
circumstances involved in order to take account of the diversity of dis-
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 656,
818 (1994) [hereinafter SAA].
175. See Pescatore, supra note 124, at 38 (the antidumping standard of review "quite
evidently runs counter [to] the idea of an objective assessment of facts by independent pan-
els, as this particular 'standard of review' serves no other purpose than to superimpose the
assessment of the facts by the administration of the defendant Member to the assessment at
which a panel might on its own judgment arrive").
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pute contexts. However, Members ultimately may need to reconsider
and clarify the appropriate standard of review of factual issues.
The third aspect of this issue is an assessment of whether the Mem-
ber has conformed with its WTO obligations. As to panel review of
legal issues, the requirement of an "objective assessment" may be in-
consistent with a panel deferring to a Member's interpretation of its
legal obligations as opposed to reaching what the panel considers as the
best interpretation of the WTO obligations. This approach (i.e., requir-
ing that a panel should select the best interpretation of the relevant
provisions) is supported by policy concerns. If panels deferred to na-
tional interpretations, this could result in a number of diverging
permissible interpretations. Petersmann argues that this "could trans-
form the WTO into a 'tower of Babel' and conflict with the declared
objective of the WTO dispute settlement procedures to protect legal se-
curity . . . 76 Moreover, some have argued that national authorities
have no greater expertise in interpreting the WTO obligations than do
panels, so there is little reason for a panel to defer to them.
77
To date, there are three significant cases addressing the "standard of




In United States-Wool Shirts, India argued that a U.S. safeguard
action against imports of woven wool shirts and blouses violated Arti-
cles 6, 8, and 2 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ("ATC").
India's main claim was that the United States had failed to demonstrate
the existence of serious damage to the U.S. industry, as required by ATC
Article 6. With respect to the appropriate standard of review, India ar-
gued that the panel should determine whether the United States had
observed the requirements of Article 6 in "good faith," but that the panel
should not determine whether the United States had acted "reasonably." '
79
176. Petersmann, supra note 2, at 103.
177. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 54, at 208; see also supra note 123 and accom-
panying text.
178. WTO Secretariat, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-
Made Fibre Underwear: Report of the Panel, WT/DS24IR (Nov. 8, 1996) (last downloaded
May 20, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletin1.htm> [hereinafter United States-
Underwear (Panel Report)].
179. United States-Wool Shirts (Panel Report), supra note 153, para. 7.13. See also id.
paras. 5.7-5.8. India stated that it was
not requesting the Panel to conduct a de novo review of the matter and to replace
the United States' determination by its own, but was asking the Panel to objec-
tively assess, in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, whether the United States
had made its determination in accordance with its obligations under Article 6 of
the ATC.
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In contrast, the United States argued that the panel should determine
"whether the US authorities could reasonably and in good faith have
determined that serious damage or actual threat thereof existed, not
whether serious damage or actual threat thereof existed, as such." "o The
EC, appearing as a third party, stressed that the standard of review issue
was "of great importance," and argued that while on factual issues "a
margin of discretion should be left to [the national] authorities," the U.S.
approach of seeking "extreme deference" to national determinations was
inappropriate because panels should not simply transpose the deferential
standard of review used in U.S. administrative law. '
The panel in United States-Wool Shirts essentially avoided ruling
on the standard of review issue, repeating the language of Article 11
without providing an explanation of what this language requires. 82 The
panel did state that "[w]hen assessing the WTO compatibility of the de-
cision to impose national trade remedies, DSU panels do not
reinvestigate the market situation but rather limit themselves to the evi-
dence used by the importing Member in making its determination to
impose the measure." 83 But this elaboration is of little help because it
only addresses what evidence the panel will consider, and not the stan-
dard of review the panel will apply in evaluating that evidence. Nor can
one glean an approach to the standard of review issue from the panel's
ultimate decision. Because the panel found that the United States had
failed to consider several factors that the United States was obliged to
consider under the ATC,'" the panel did not address the issue of whether
Id. para. 5.7.
180. Id. para. 7.13; see also id. paras. 5.9-5.21. The United States did not reject India's
argument that it was bound to act in "good faith," but interpreted that requirement to mean
simply that it had to act "in accordance with standards of honesty, trust, sincerity, etc.' " Id.
para. 5.20.
181. Id. paras. 4.11-4.12. The EC placed great weight on the unadopted GATT 1947
panel report in United States-Lead and Bismuth Steel, noting that in the context of review-
ing factual assessments by domestic authorities, the panel had rejected the idea of applying
the standard of review used in the GATT signatories' domestic law systems. Id. para. 4.12
(citing United States-Lead and Bismuth Steel).
182. Id. para. 7.16.
183. Id. para. 7.21. The statement appears to be limited to the context of national trade
remedies (i.e., safeguard, antidumping, or countervailing duty actions), which are made on
an administrative record. Outside those contexts, it has been established that panels may
consider evidence not relied on by a Member in deciding whether the Member has acted
consistently with its WTO obligations. See infra Part III.E.
184. See id. para. 7.51. The panel stated in paragraph 7.52 that in the safeguard context,
"[tihe relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the
ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case," which
suggests that a panel should not reweigh the evidence in this context. Id. para. 7.52. How-
ever, whether this conclusion has any impact on the standard of review issue in other
contexts is unclear given that Article 6.3 of the ATC simply required the United States to
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the U.S. finding of "serious damage" was justified on the merits. The
standard of review issue was not appealed by either side to the Appellate
Body.
United States-Underwear involved a safeguard action taken by the
United States against Costa Rican imports, which Costa Rica challenged
as violating the ATC. The United States argued that the appropriate
standard to apply to the U.S. decision was "a standard of reasonable-
ness" 185 and that Costa Rica had to provide "convincing evidence that
[the U.S. action] was unreasonable." 18 6 Costa Rica argued that the panel
must, inter alia, analyze whether the United States establishment of the
facts was "proper," whether the United States had objectively evaluated
those facts, and whether the United States had properly exercised its
discretion in interpreting its legal obligations.8 7 Costa Rica emphasized
that absent an express rule to the contrary (as existed in the Antidump-
ing Agreement), there was no limitation on the panel's power of
review.'u Costa Rica argued that the "reasonableness" standard advo-
cated by the United States was not even sanctioned by the Antidumping
Agreement, let alone the ATC. 89
The panel noted that the DSU "does not contain a provision man-
dating a specific standard of review," but described Article 11 as the
"main relevant provision of the DSU." "~ The panel rejected an approach
of "total deference" to the national authorities, which the panel said
could not ensure the "objective assessment" required by Article 11.191
However, the panel also rejected a de novo review in which panel review
would be a "substitute" for the national authorities' proceedings. 92 The
panel analogized to GATT panel decisions in the antidumping and
consider these various factors. One possible impact could be in the context of reviewing
injury decisions in countervailing duty determinations. See also SCM Agreement, supra note
62, art. 15.4 (listing "relevant economic factors" that must be considered). However, most
WTO obligations are more narrowly drawn, requiring that a particular factual determination
be made, rather than requiring that a range of factors be considered. See, e.g., SCM Agree-
ment, supra note 62, art. 1.1 (requiring determination of whether a "financial contribution" is
provided).
185. United States-Underwear (Panel Report), supra note 178, para. 5.32 (citing Re-
port on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession under Article XIX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Concerning Women's Fur Felt Hats and Hat Bodies,
CP/106 (Mar. 27, 1951) (the "Fur Felt Hat" case)).
186. Id. para. 5.41. The United States further said that the panel needed only to decide
whether the national authorities had examined the requisite factors and adequately explained
the basis for their decision. Id. para. 5.45.
187. See id. para. 5.47.
188. See id. paras. 5.50, 5.54.
189. See id. para. 5.58.
190. Id. paras. 7.8, 7.9.
.191. Id. para. 7.10.
192. See id. para. 7.12.
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countervailing area, which had rejected de novo review.' However, this
reliance on GATI' practice in the antidumping area does not take into
account the new Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement, which
contemplates a different standard of review for antidumping decisions.
The panel then stated its view of what an "objective assessment"
would require:
In our view, an objective assessment would entail an examination
of whether the [U.S. authority] had examined all relevant facts be-
fore it (including facts which might detract from an affirmative
determination in accordance with the second sentence of Article
6.2 of the ATC), whether adequate explanation had been provided
of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made,
and, consequently, whether the determination made was consis-
tent with the international obligations of the United States.'
The panel cited no authority for this interpretation of Article 11, and
the interpretation seems at odds with the DSU text. It is not sufficient
for national authorities to reach their decisions in an "objective" manner
for the panels to affirm the decision. The national authorities may have
acted objectively, but incorrectly. Under DSU Article 11, panels have
the duty to make their own "objective assessment of the facts of the
case." Panels will not fulfill this function if they simply determine
whether the national authorities established the facts in an objective
manner. Article 11 does not require the panel to ensure that the Member
has made an objective assessment. Article 11 requires the panel to make
an objective assessment. Decisions such as Underwear that simply re-
quire the Member to act in an objective fashion appear inconsistent with
the terms of Article 11. Thus, whether or not the panel in Underwear
reached an appropriate result in terms of deference due, the result is dif-
ficult to justify from the text of the DSU. 95
193. See id. The panel further stated that its task was to "examine the consistency of the
US action with the international obligations of the United States, and not the consistency of
the US action with the US domestic statute implementing the international obligations of the
United States." Id. While this statement is correct, how this statement determines the appro-
priate standard of review in evaluating whether the United States satisfied its WTO
obligations is hard to see.
194. Id. para. 7.13.
195. Professor McGovern states that the United States-Underwear decision "explicitly
adopted" the deferential principles of standard of review developed in the antidumping and
countervailing duty context. McGovern, supra note 53, § 2.2324. He views such deference as
justifiable where there are "detailed procedural and substantive rules" in place, so as to en-
sure that "due process" is applied by the national government. Id. For this reason, he does
not view deference as "controversial" in the context of safeguard decisions that are subject to
detailed procedural and substantive rules. He questions whether a deferential standard of
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The most recent, and perhaps the most significant, of the WTO de-
cisions addressing the appropriate standard of review is EC-Beef
Hormones. In its appeal to the Appellate Body, the EC argued that the
panel had failed to apply an appropriate standard of review in assessing
various EC acts and certain scientific evidence.19 6 The EC argued that
WTO panels should adopt a "deferential 'reasonableness' standard when
reviewing a Member's decisions to adopt a particular science policy"
because past GATT' panels had rejected de novo review, and the
"reasonable deference" standard embodied in the WTO Antidumping
Agreement should be applied to "all highly complex factual situa-
tions."1 97 In response, the United States agreed that a panel was not to
conduct a de novo review, but said that "nothing in the SPS Agreement
or the WTO Agreement requires a Panel to defer to the Member main-
taining the SPS measure," pointing out that the standard used in the
Antidumping Agreement did not apply in this context. 9 '
The Appellate Body disagreed with the EC argument. The Appellate
Body first determined the relevant legal provisions and noted that nei-
ther the SPS Agreement, nor the DSU, nor any other WTO agreements
(other than the Antidumping Agreement) prescribe a particular standard
of review. 99 The Appellate Body expressly rejected the idea that the
Antidumping Agreement standard of review can be applied in other
contexts, stating that "[tiextually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-
Dumping Agreement." m The Appellate Body then held that Article 11
of the DSU "bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with
great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of
review of determinations under the ATC was justified because there are few procedural rules
for such decisions. Without taking issue with Professor McGovern on the substantive issue of
when deference is appropriate, he does not explain how his preferred approach is based on
the DSU text agreed by the Members. The DSU text does not suggest that deference is ap-
propriate in situations where there is a greater level of procedural protections at the national
level. Nonetheless, as discussed above, allowing panels some flexibility in varying the stan-
dard of review in different contexts may be necessary.
196. WTO Secretariat, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones):
AB-1997-4, WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, paras. 13-15 (Jan. 16, 1998) (last down-
loaded May 20, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter EC-Beef
Hormones (Appellate Body)]. For instance, the EC argued that the panel had not accorded
deference to the EC's decision to set and apply a level of sanitary protection higher than the
relevant international standard. Id. para. 13.
197. Id. paras. 14-15. The EC argued that under the correct "deference" standard, a
panel "should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but in-
stead examine whether the 'procedure' required by the relevant WTO rules had been
followed." Id. para. 111.
198. Id. paras. 41-42.
199. See id. para. 114.
200. Id.
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review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the
legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements." 0,
In the context of "fact-finding by panels," the Appellate Body inter-
preted Article 11 as requiring neither "total deference" to the national
determination nor a de novo review, but rather an "'objective assessment
of the facts.' "202 But what is required by this "objective assessment"?
The Appellate Body provides some guidance later in its opinion. It
states that:
In the present appeal, the European Communities repeatedly
claims that the Panel disregarded or distorted or misrepresented
the evidence submitted by the European Communities and even
the opinions expressed by the Panel's own expert advisors. The
duty to make an objective assessment of the facts is, among
other things, an obligation to consider the evidence presented to
a panel and to make factual findings on the basis of that evi-
dence. The deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the
evidence submitted to a panel is incompatible with a panel's
duty to make an objective assessment of the facts. The willful
distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence put before a
panel is similarly inconsistent with an objective assessment of
the facts. "Disregard" and "distortion" and "misrepresentation"
of the evidence, in the ordinary signification in judicial and
quasi-judicial processes, imply not simply an error of judgment
in the appreciation of evidence but rather an egregious error that
calls into question the good faith of a panel. A claim that a
panel disregarded or distorted the evidence submitted to it is, in
effect, a claim that the panel, to a greater or lesser degree, de-
nied the party submitting the evidence fundamental fairness, or
what in many jurisdictions is known as due process of law or
natural justice.0 3
The Appellate Body then considered and rejected the EC's claim on
this issue. The Appellate Body found that the panel had engaged in an
"objective assessment" of the facts-i.e., had acted in good faith.
201. Id. para. 116.
202. Id. para. 117. The Appellate Body stated that de novo review would be inappropri-
ate because "under current practice and systems, [panels] are in any case poorly suited to
engage in such a review." Id. The Appellate Body rejected "total deference" because it would
not ensure an "objective assessment" as required by Article 11 of the DSU. Id. (citing United
States-Underwear, WT/DS24/R para. 7.10 (Feb. 25, 1997)).
203. Id. para. 133.
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The Appellate Body's interpretation of "objective assessment" ap-
pears incomplete. The Appellate Body identified one way in which a
panel can fail to perform an objective assessment-i.e., if the panel fails
to act in "good faith" by disregarding evidence submitted to it. However,
the Appellate Body described this obligation as "among other things"
that are part of the duty to undertake an "objective assessment." The
Appellate Body did not find that a panel only violates Article 11 where
it does not act in good faith, but merely found that failure to act in good
faith is one way in which a panel violates Article 11; the reference to
"other things" suggests that there are other elements of the Article 11
requirement.2°4 The EC-Beef Hormones decision does not resolve either
the critical question, discussed above, of whether a panel must find a
Member's decision inconsistent with its obligations if it finds that the
evidence does not support the Member's action, or the question of
whether a panel should grant some deference to the Member's interpre-
tation of the evidence.0 5 Thus, despite the "sufficient clarity" of Article
11, the core question regarding standard of review-i.e., the parameters
of an "objective assessment"-remains to be litigated.
The Appellate Body's rejection of the EC's argument regarding a
"reasonable deference" standard, discussed above, could be read as sug-
gesting that the Appellate Body does not believe that extensive
deference to Member fact-finding is required (outside the Antidumping
Agreement). However, it may be that the Appellate Body disagreed with
the particular formulation advanced by the EC, which was closely
204. However, in a recent decision, the Appellate Body appeared to interpret the
"objective assessment" requirement in Article 11 quite narrowly. See WTO Secretariat,
European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products:
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS69/SB/R (July 13, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Poultry
(Appellate Body)]. The appellant, Brazil, argued that the panel had failed to make an objec-
tive assessment because it allegedly had failed to consider a series of arguments put forward
by Brazil. The Appellate Body rejected Brazil's appeal on this issue, stating that:
An allegation that a panel has failed to conduct the "objective assessment of the
matter before it" required by Article 11 of the DSU is a very serious allegation.
Such an allegation goes to the very core of the integrity of the WTO dispute set-
tlement process itself .... The alleged failures imputed to the Panel by Brazil do
not approach the level of gravity required for a claim under Article 11 of the DSU
to prevail.
Id., paras. 133-34.
By suggesting that Article 11 only requires that panels act in good faith, EC-Poultry
may indicate that the Appellate Body is adopting a narrow approach to the question of
whether panels have violated Article 11. See infra Section V.C.
205. For instance, if a panel defers to a Member's factual finding, the complaining
Member may be able to appeal the panel decision to the Appellate Body on the ground that
the panel had failed to engage in an objective assessment of the facts.
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linked to the Antidumping Agreement. There is a wide spectrum of pos-
sible standards of review, varying from de novo review at one end to
"total deference" at the other. The Appellate Body's decision in EC-
Beef Hormones narrows the spectrum somewhat by holding that panels
are not required to defer to any "reasonable" factual finding, but signifi-
cant uncertainty still remains regarding the appropriate standard of
review.
C. Role of Precedent
A fundamental issue for any judicial system is the extent to which
past decisions are binding on future judicial decision-makers. In the
two-tiered DSU system, there are two broad issues. First, there is the
issue of whether a panel is bound by an earlier panel decision. This is-
sue can arise either when a subsequent panel considers a situation with
the same parties and facts (a law-of-the-case issue), or when a subse-
quent panel considers the same legal issue that was decided by the first
panel. Second, there is the issue of whether panels are bound by Appel-
late Body decisions. As discussed below, the broad outlines of the
WTO's practice in this area have been established. However, some in-
teresting questions remain, including whether a series of panel decisions
can create an established "practice."
1. Effect of Panel Reports
Under GAIT practice, panel rulings on a particular legal issue did
not bar subsequent panels from reconsidering the issue.2°0 This was true
even if the panel ruling was adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties
because, under the GATI', parties did not treat adoption as tantamount to
endorsement by all the member countries. Indeed, panel rulings were
not treated as binding even in situations involving virtually identical
facts, as shown by the several rounds of litigation regarding European
apple import restrictions. In that case, two 1989 GATT panels ruled that
they were not bound by a 1980 panel decision addressing an earlier ver-
sion of the same restrictions. The panel report stated that "[w]hile taking
careful note of the earlier panel reports, the Panel did not consider they
206. As Professor Hudec describes the justification for this rule,
[t]he unstated assumption of most GATT governments had been that, while
adopted panel reports could undoubtedly be cited as supporting precedent for sub-
sequent decisions, neither the manner [in] which they were made nor the manner
[in which] they were adopted were rigorous enough to entitle the precise legal
rulings in such decisions to binding effect on future controversies.
HUDEC, supra note 4, at 263.
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relieved it of the responsibility, under its terms of reference, to carry out
its own thorough examination on this important point." "
GAYT practices, though they are not binding, are often looked to for
guidance by WTO panels or the Appellate Body in resolution of specific
issues. Article XVI: I of the WTO Agreement and Paragraph 1(b)(iv) of
Annex 1A affirm "the importance to the Members of the WTO of the
experience acquired by the Contracting Parties to the GAT 1947-and
acknowledge[] the continuing relevance of that experience to the new
trading system served by the WTO."20 8
The Appellate Body in Japan-Alcohol Taxes explicitly concluded
that adopted panel reports are not binding in subsequent cases, even in
cases involving the same parties and essentially the same facts. In that
case, a GATT 1947 panel had addressed very similar arguments regard-
ing Japan's alcohol tax regime. The WTO panel followed the decision of
the GAT 1947 panel, holding that that adopted panel reports
"constitute subsequent practice in a specific case by virtue of the deci-
sion to adopt them.' 2°9 The existence of "subsequent practice" is an
important element of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Vienna Convention is relevant,
in turn, because DSU Article 3.2 requires panels to interpret the WTO
agreements in accordance with "customary rules of interpretation of
public international law." 10
The Appellate Body disagreed with the panel, holding instead that
adopted panel reports constitute neither definitive interpretations of
GAT 1947 or GATT 1994, nor agreement by the Contracting Parties on
the legal reasoning contained in the panel report."' The Appellate Body
concluded that the GAT practice should be continued under WTO dis-
pute settlement because the Contracting Parties had not contemplated a
change from the earlier GAT practice,"' that the Ministerial Confer-
ence and the General Council have the exclusive authority to adopt
207. European Community-Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples, UJ6491, June
22, 1989 GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.), at 93, 127 (1990).
208. Japan-Alcohol Taxes (Appellate Body), supra note 7, at 13.
209. WTO Secretariat, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages: Report of the Panel,
WT/DS8/R, WT/DSIO/R and WT/DS I/R, para. 6.10 (July 11, 1996) (last downloaded May
20, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/disputes/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter Japan-Alcohol Taxes
(Panel Report)], para. 6.10.
210. DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.2.
211. See Japan-Alcohol Taxes (Appellate Body), supra note 7, at 12-14.
212. See id. at 13 ("We do not believe that the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in deciding
to adopt a panel report, intended that their decision would constitute a definitive interpreta-
tion of the relevant provisions of GAIT 1947. Nor do we believe that this is contemplated
under GAlT 1994.").
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interpretations of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements," 3 and that continuity was a goal throughout the formation
of the WTO.2 4
The Appellate Body's decision in Japan-Alcohol Taxes, regarding
the lack of prece'dential effect even in the specific case, is somewhat
troubling from the standpoint of effective dispute resolution. The deci-
sion raises the specter of a challenged Member bringing the particular
measure challenged into conformity with its WTO obligations, but then
enacting a slightly different measure that operates in essentially the
same way, and forcing the complaining Member into relitigation of the
same legal question. 25 The Appellate Body may have reasoned that
Members are unlikely to act in such bad faith, and that this risk was
outweighed by the need for a strong political signal that under no cir-
cumstances can WTO panels make law. Only time will tell whether the
decision will encourage such behavior by Members.
One possible interpretation of the Appellate Body's decision in Ja-
pan-Alcohol Taxes is that the Appellate Body was not saying that panel
decisions can never constitute "subsequent practice" under Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention, but was simply saying that a single panel deci-
sion is insufficient to constitute such "practice."2 6 This suggests that if
several panel reports followed the same interpretation on a particular
213. See id. Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement states "The Ministerial Conference
and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this
Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements." Specificity in granting this exclusive
authority indicates that authority in interpreting the treaty does not exist elsewhere. See id.
214. See Japan-Alcohol Taxes (Appellate Body), supra note 7, at 13. Article XVI:l
and Paragraph I(b)(iv) of Annex 1A, incorporating GATT 1947 into the WTO, bring legal
history into the WTO in a way that ensures continuity and consistency between the two sys-
tems. The Appellate Body stated that panel reports are an important part of this continuity,
and their status has not changed under the new WTO Agreement. See id.
215. See Petersmann, supra note 2, at 84 ("The need for repeated GATTIWTO dispute
settlement proceedings against essentially the same measures because of non-compliance
with GATr/WTO law and with previous dispute settlement findings can raise problems of
due process of law and good faith").
216. The Appellate Body stated that "[a]n isolated act is generally not sufficient to es-
tablish subsequent practice; it is a sequence of acts establishing the agreement of the parties
that is relevant." Japan-Alcohol Taxes (Appellate Body), supra note 7, at 13 (footnotes
omitted). Petersmann criticizes this reasoning for failing to recognize that the consideration
and adoption of panel reports by the GATT Council "could make such reports more than an
'isolated act.' " Petersmann, supra note 2, at 39 n.51. However, as the Appellate Body stated,
it is doubtful whether WTO Members understand themselves to be ratifying panel reports in
this sense, particularly now that adoption is virtually automatic. Another commentator has
criticized the Appellate Body for not distinguishing between subsequent agreements (a con-
tractual concept) and subsequent practice (a factual concept). See Sacerdoti, supra note 27,
at 279. While the adoption of a panel report may not represent an "agreement of the parties,"
a repeated series of panel decisions could nonetheless establish a "subsequent practice."
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legal point, a WTO panel could be under some obligation to act consis-
tently with this "practice," even if not legally bound by the past
decisions."7 Indeed, the United States has argued that the mere fact of
publication of a panel decision, combined with a long period of time in
which the panel's interpretation is not contested, is sufficient to make
the panel's approach "subsequent practice" under the Vienna Conven-
tion."'
Japan-Alcohol Taxes also reaffirmed that unadopted panel reports
have no legal status in the GATT or W'TO system because they have not
been endorsed by the Contracting Parties to GATI' or by the W'TO
Members. Nevertheless, said the Appellate Body, a panel could find
guidance in the reasoning of such reports if the panel deemed the un-
adopted report to be relevant to the case at hand.219
2. Effect of Appellate Body Decisions
Thus far, WTO cases have not confronted the question of whether
Appellate Body decisions are binding on subsequent panels. The only
rather shadowy guidance on this issue comes from the Appellate Body's
decision in United States-Wool Shirts. There, the Appellate Body ad-
dressed a different issue: whether a panel is required to address issues
presented to it if those issues need not be resolved in order to dispose of
the dispute.220 The Appellate Body stated that "[g]iven the explicit aim
of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that
Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Ap-
pellate Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO
Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute." 22' This
statement suggests a discomfort on the part of the Appellate Body with
the concept of "making law." Since Appellate Body decisions would
indeed "make law" if they were binding on future panels, the statement
suggests that the Appellate Body would not hold that its decisions are
binding, if the issue were presented.
217. In this context, Professor Jackson has called attention to a useful distinction be-
tween the U.S. concept of stare decisis, which has not been applied at the WTO, and the
European practice of according significant weight to past rulings without treating them as
legally binding. Statement of Professor Jackson, ABA Conference on WTO Dispute Resolu-
tion, Feb. 20, 1998.
218. See United States-Underwear (Panel Report), supra note 178, para. 5.43 (United
States arguing that the Fur Felt Hat decision had become "customary law, or at the least
'subsequent practice'... ").
219. See Japan-Alcohol Taxes (Appellate Body), supra note 7, at 14.
220. See supra Part III.A.2.
221. United States-Wool Shirts (Appellate Body), supra note 94, at 20.
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The Appellate Body in United States-Wool Shirts also referred to
the fact that authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement
and the Multilateral Trade Agreements is located elsewhere in WTO
machinery. Following the decision in Japan-Alcohol Taxes, the Ap-
pellate Body pointed out that Article IX of the WTO Agreement gives
the Ministerial Conference and the General Council the "exclusive
authority" to adopt such interpretations, 22 and that this concept is also
recognized in Article 3.9 of the DSU.23 The Appellate Body seems to be
suggesting that even if it were inclined to hold that its decisions were
binding, it may not have the power to do so under these instruments.
However, the issue is quite unlikely to be presented, absent a clear
error of law by the Appellate Body. Panels are strongly motivated to act
consistently with prior Appellate Body decisions. Indeed, one partici-
pant at a recent conference suggested that the WTO Secretariat-which
assists panelists-seeks to ensure that panel decisions are "Appellate
Body-proof." 224 Thus, the question of whether Appellate Body decisions
are legally binding may be of more interest to commentators than to
WTO Members in practice or to practitioners. Still, one recent panel has
interpreted the Appellate Body's decision in Japan-Alcohol Taxes as
meaning that "panel reports and Appellate Body reports ... are not
binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between
the parties to that dispute."2
D. Burden of Proof
The burden of proof issue is whether the complaining party always
has the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement, or whether the bur-
den may shift to the challenged Member in certain conditions, and if so,
222. Id. (citing Japan-Alcohol Taxes (Appellate Body) at 13).
223. See id. Article 3.9 of the DSU states: "The provisions of this Understanding are
without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions
of a covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement or a covered
agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement" See also India-Patent Protection
(Appellate Body), supra note 144, paras. 46-47 (stating that "[b]oth panels and the Appellate
Body must be guided by the rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention,
and must not add to or diminish rights and obligations provided in the WTO Agreement" and
that "both panels and the Appellate Body are bound by" DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2.).
224. Statement of panelist, ABA Symposium, supra note 35.
225. Indonesia-Autos, supra note 35, n. 639 (citing Japan-Alcohol Taxes (Appellate
Body)). See also WTO Secretariat, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agri-
cultural Chemical Products: Report of the Panel, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998), para. 7.30
("panels are not bound by previous decisions of panels or the Appellate Body even if the
subject-matter is the same.").
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when. 6 Several WTO decisions have addressed this issue, reaching
consistent results, and therefore only the most significant decisions in
United States-Wool Shirts and EC-Beef Hormones will be discussed
in detail here.
In Wool Shirts, India argued that it should not have to prove that the
United States had violated the ATC, but that instead the United States
should have to prove that the United States was justified in relying on
the "exception" to WTO disciplines created by the safeguard procedure
of Article 6 of the ATC.2 7 The United States argued that, based on ac-
cepted GATT 1947 dispute settlement practice, India had the burden to
make a prima facie case that the U.S. safeguard measure was inconsis-
tent with its obligations.2 8 Thus, an important issue in the Wool Shirts
case was whether the ATC was an "exception" to WTO obligations such
that the United States had the burden of proving that the conditions for
the exception were met.
The panel agreed with the United States and stated that because In-
dia had initiated the proceedings, India had to establish that the U.S.
restriction was inconsistent with the United States' obligations.2 9 The
panel explained that India had to make a prima facie case of violation,
which would shift the burden to the United States to prove the con-
trary.23 However, the panel did not provide much explanation of the
reasoning underlying this decision.
The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's conclusion but provided a
different rationale. The Appellate Body held that India had to provide
evidence and argument "sufficient to establish a presumption" of viola-
tion and that "it was then up to the United States to bring evidence and
argument to rebut the presumption., 231 The Appellate Body cited the
international law rule that a party asserting a fact must prove that fact.
32
The Appellate Body said that the ATC was a free-standing transitional
arrangement rather than an exception to WTO disciplines (as the panel
had held), and emphasized that the ATC balance of rights and obliga-
tions could be upset by requiring the United States to demonstrate that it
226. In principle, the concept of burden of proof "only applies to facts, not to issues of
law," Joost Pauwelyn, "Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who
Bears the Burden?," 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 227, 242 (1998). However, most contested issues are
mixed questions of fact and law, making this distinction problematic to apply in practice.
227. See United States-Wool Shirts (Panel Report), supra note 153, paras. 5.2, 5.3.
228. See id. paras. 5.4-5.6.
229. See id. para. 7.12.
230. See id. para. 6.7.
231. United States-Wool Shirts (Appellate Body), supra note 94, at 13.
232. Id. at 14.
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had not violated its commitments .2 Thus, the Appellate Body essen-
tially reasoned that the substantive deal struck in the ATC required the
allocation of the burden of proof to complaining countries.
However, the Appellate Body's case-specific approach appeared to
leave open the door for complaining countries to argue that particular
WTO agreements constitute "exceptions" from WTO obligations such
that the burden of proof must shift. Such possibility would be particu-
larly relevant to WTO review of antidumping and countervailing
determinations because past GATT 1947 panels have held that the anti-
dumping and countervailing duty provisions of the GAT were
exceptions from the broader GATT disciplines.M  More generally, the
Appellate Body's decision left murky the manner in which Members
and future panels should determine whether a particular provision or
agreement is an "exception" that shifts the burden of proof, or whether
there are other situations where the complaining country does not have
the burden of proof.
Subsequent panels, such as EC-Computer Equipment, applied the
Wool Shirts approach in allocating the burden of proof between the
complaining and defending Members. 235 In Japan-Film, the panel re-
ferred to the Wool Shirts rule regarding the allocation of burden of
proof, but went on to emphasize that the burden on the complaining
Member is higher in the context of a "nullification or impairment" case
under GATT 1994 Article XXIII:1(b). Citing Article 26.1 of the DSU,
the panel stated that the complaining Member in such a case must pro-
233. See id. at 16. The Appellate Body recognized that Members asserting an affirma-
tive defense, such as a GATT 1994 Article XX defense that a measure is justified on
environmental grounds, should have the burden of proof. Id.
234. See, e.g., United States-Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork
from Canada: Report by the Panel, July 11, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.) at 30 (1992).
Cf Petersmann, supra note 2, at 101 ("GATT panels have placed the burden of proof for the
GATT-consistent conduct of anti-dumping procedures on the country basing its discrimina-
tory duties on [GAT] Article VI").
235. EC-Computer Equipment (Panel Report), supra note 148, paras. 8.34-8.35, 8.39-
8.40. The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's approach as being consistent with the stan-
dard set out in Wool Shirts. See EC-Computer Equipment (Appellate Body), supra note 151,
para. 103. See also India-Patent Protection, where the Appellate Body upheld the panel's
application of the burden of proof rule established in Wool Shirts, finding that the United
States had established a prima facie case that India's administrative guidance regarding mail-
box applications was legally insufficient to prevail over mandatory provisions in its Patents
Act. India-Patent Protection (Appellate Body), supra note 144, para. 74. In upholding the
panel, the Appellate Body emphasized that "it is not sufficient for a panel to enunciate the
correct approach to burden of proof; a panel must also apply the burden of proof correctly,"
recognizing that (as occurred in EC-Beef Hormones), it is quite possible for a panel to un-
dermine the burden of proof rule by shifting the burden prematurely to the challenged
Member. Id.
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vide a "detailed justification" supporting its allegations in order to shift
the burden to the defending member.236 In EC Beef Hormones, the
panel also applied the Wool Shirts framework, although the Appellate
Body overturned the panel's application of the burden of proof in the
particular context of that case.237 Of particular importance, the Appellate
Body's decision addressed the issue of whether a provision is an
"exception" that shifts the burden of proof. The Appellate Body stated
that:
The general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a
complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsis-
tency with a provision of the SPS Agreement before the burden
of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the
defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same
provision as an "exception."23 s
This decision appears to be aimed at discouraging the proliferation
of arguments that a particular provision or agreement is an "exception"
that shifts the burden of proof. However, the burden of proof will be im-
posed on the defending Member when the Member relies on an
"affirmative defense." In United States-Shrimp, the panel cited the
"well-established practice" of allocating the burden of establishing an
affirmative defense to the defending Member.239 The panel quoted the
Appellate Body's dictum in Wool Shirts that:
Articles XX and XI:2(c)(I) are limited exceptions from obliga-
tions under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not
positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are
236. Japan-Film, supra note 98, para. 10.30.
237. The case involved a U.S. claim that an EC ban on beef and beef products treated
with certain hormones was in violation of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Measures [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. The panel had imposed the initial burden of
proof on the United States to make out a prima facie violation of the SPS Agreement and
stated that once this was done, the burden of proof shifts to the responding party, consistent
with Wool Shirts. See EC-Beef Hormones (Panel Report), supra note 148, para. LIX (citing
the Appellate Body's decision in Wool Shirts). However, the panel interpreted the SPS
Agreement to mean that once the United States had established that there was an interna-
tional standard with respect to the safety of the hormones at issue, and that the EC measure
was not based on this standard, the burden of proof shifted to the EC. Id. para. XCV. The
Appellate Body held that the panel had erred in allocating the burden of proof to the EC
based on these findings, because the SPS Agreement should not be interpreted to mean that a
prima facie violation exists where a national standard is not based on the relevant interna-
tional standard. See EC-Beef Hormones (Appellate Body), supra note 196, paras. 97-109.
238. EC-Beef Hormones (Appellate Body), supra note 196, para. 104.
239. United States-Shrimp, supra note 3, para. 30 of Panel Findings. The panel in that
case imposed the burden of establishing the applicability of Article XX on the United States,
as the party asserting the affirmative defense. Id.
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in the nature of affirmative defenses. It is only reasonable that
the burden of establishing such a defense should rest on the
party asserting it.240
A problem here may be how to determine that a provision is an
"affirmative defense," which shifts the burden of proof. As yet, it is un-
clear what the standard will be for identifying an affirmative defense. 1
Also the decisions have not resolved the question of what standard
must be met in order to establish a prima facie case that a violation ex-
ists. The Appellate Body has said that a single standard should not be
set and has stated that "precisely how much and precisely what kind of
evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessar-
ily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to
case." 242
E. Panel Fact-Finding
The panel fact-finding issue relates to whether a panel has the
authority to engage in fact-finding beyond the record presented by the
disputing Members. DSU Article 13.1 provides that:
Each panel shall have the right to seek information and techni-
cal advice from any individual or body which it deems
appropriate.... A Member should respond promptly and fully
to any request by a panel for such information as the panel con-
siders necessary and appropriate ... 243
This provision appears to give panels latitude to request information
from any individual or body-i.e., the panel is not limited to seeking
information from Members. However, the provision does not require
that private persons comply (because the DSU is an agreement among
governments), nor does it obligate Members to require private persons
to comply. Indeed, even Members are not strictly required to comply
with a panel request for information because Article 13.1 uses the term
"should" rather than the term "shall."
As of yet, panels do not appear to have relied on Article 13.1 to re-
quest relevant information from Members. However, in Argentina-
Footwear, the panel created a presumption against Argentina based on
the fact that Argentina had not provided relevant documents when re-
240. See id. n. 635.
241. See Pauwelyn, supra note 226, at 252 (stating that the Appellate Body "did not
really explain" why certain provisions are deemed exceptions and others are not).
242. United States-Wool Shirts (Appellate Body), supra note 94, at 14.
243. DSU, supra note 5, art. 13.1.
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quested to do so by the complaining Member, the United States. As dis-
cussed earlier, an important factual issue in this case was whether
Argentina's import duty scheme resulted in duties above Argentina's
tariff binding. After presenting examples to demonstrate that the duties
were excessive, the United States requested that Argentina produce ad-
ditional customs invoices, which Argentina refused to do.2 The panel
held that the evidence presented by the United States, combined with
"the fact that Argentina did not present any convincing evidence to the
contrary," created a presumption that excess duties were imposed.45 In
reaching this conclusion, the panel made some general observations
about the duties of Members to provide information to WTO panels:
Another incidental rule to the burden of proof is the requirement
for collaboration of the parties in the presentation of the facts
and evidence to the panel and especially the role of the respon-
dent in that process.... In this context the most important result
of the rule of collaboration appears to be that the adversary is
obligated to provide the tribunal with relevant documents which
are in its sole possession. This obligation does not arise until the
claimant has done its best to secure evidence and has actually
produced some prima facie evidence in support of its case. It
should be stressed, however, that "'discovery' of documents, in
its common-law system sense, is not available in international
procedures." 46
Given this discussion (for which the panel does not cite support in
the DSU or GAT' practice), Argentina-Footwear may serve as a semi-
nal decision for imposing an obligation on Members to provide
information to panels. 247
244. See Argentina-Footwear (Panel Report), supra note 68, paras. 6.52-6.54.
245. Id. para. 6.61. A related point is that a Member cannot avoid a required burden of
proof by arguing that the evidence is too confidential to be submitted to the panel. In Indone-
sia-Autos, the panel held that the United States had failed to demonstrate the existence of
serious prejudice, as it was required to do. The panel rejected U.S. arguments that the neces-
sary information was confidential, noting that DSU art. 18.2 allows Parties to designate
information as confidential and stating that the United States was free to propose additional
procedures to protect the confidentiality of the information. Indonesia-Autos, supra note
35, paras. 14.7, 14.235 (parties may not "invoke confidentiality as a basis for their failure to
submit the positive evidence required").
246. Id. para. 6.40 (quoting MOJTABA KAzAzI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED
IssuEs (1996)).
247. A related issue is whether Members are allowed to provide new evidence to panels
in support of their action, even though that evidence was not relied on by the national
authoritieS. In EC-Beef Hormones, the panel refused to consider "new evidence" presented
to it by the EC during the panel process as justification for the EC ban on imports of beef
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The outer limits of the obligation are as yet unclear because there
are several other difficult issues that may arise: Can a complaining
Member request that a Member gather information that is not already in
the Member's possession? Can it request that the Member seek infor-
mation from a private entity? Are the answers different in the context of
antidumping, countervailing duty, or safeguards proceedings, which are
formal proceedings with administrative records? If panels could require
a Member to make an additional investigation on a particular factual
issue in an antidumping case, for instance, this requirement would likely
be quite controversial in the United States.248
IV. ISSUES RELATING TO REMEDIES
Once a panel has ruled in favor of the complaining Member, and the
decision is not appealed or is affirmed by the Appellate Body, what
should the panel require of the Member found to be in violation of its
obligations? There are two principal issues: (1) what type of remedy
may be required; and (2) what time period will be allowed for imple-
mentation. ' 9
A. Nature of Remedies
In considering what type of remedies are permissible, it is useful to
distinguish between retroactive remedies and specific remedies. " °
treated with hormones. EC-Beef Hormones (Panel) Report, supra note 148, para. CXXIII.
However, the panel refused because the issue before the panel was whether the EC had based
its import ban on a risk assessment regarding the hormones' safety; the panel reasoned that
the EC could not have based its ban on this "new evidence" if it had only learned of this
evidence during the panel process. Id. Thus, this decision turned on the legal issue presented
in the case and does not represent a holding that new evidence not relied on by the national
authorities cannot be presented to a panel.
248. In this way, the issue of "discovery" is related to the issue of "exhaustion" dis-
cussed in supra Section II.E: both issues raise the question of whether panels are allowed to
inquire into matters that were not before the administrative agency.
249. This article does not address the controversial issue of whether a Member found to
be in violation of its WTO commitments is legally bound to bring itself into compliance with
the panel's recommendations, or whether it is sufficient for the Member to offer compensa-
tion or suffer the suspension of concessions. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22. This issue has
not been addressed by any WTO panels, and other commentators have already discussed the
issue. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-
Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1997); Judith
Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L.
416 (1996).
250. These distinctions partly follow Hunter, supra note 43, at 579. Hunter suggests
three categories: retroactive remedies, specific remedies, and exclusive remedies. See id. The
approach here differs in that it does not address the issue of whether remedies should not
apply in the particular case brought to the panel, but should only apply to the Member's
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The possibility of retroactive remedies raises the question of
whether a WTO panel may require a Member to "correct" its past con-
duct in some way, or whether remedies are to be wholly forward-
looking. GATT practice was traditionally remedial and prospective in
nature, with the aim of bringing Members into compliance with their
commitments. 1 However, in the antidumping and countervailing duty
context, several GATT 1947 panels recommended retroactive relief in
the form of a recommendation that the Member involved refund past
duties collected. 2
In Guatemala-Cement, Mexico argued that because Guatemala had
improperly initiated the investigation, all antidumping duties should be
refunded and the antidumping order should be revoked.23 The panel first
noted that under DSU Article 19.1, its authority to "recommend" was
limited to recommending that Guatemala "bring the measure into con-
formity with [the Antidumping Agreement]."5 4  The panel then
explained that it could go beyond the recommendation in making
"suggestions" for implementation, under DSU Article 19.1, but that the
implementation of Panel rulings is to be decided, "in the first instance"
by the challenged Member.25
Based on this interpretation, the panel decided to suggest that Gua-
temala "revoke the existing anti-dumping measure" because "in our
view, this is the only appropriate way of implementing our recommen-
dation," i.e., that Guatemala conform its actions to the Antidumping
Agreement. However, the panel did not suggest that Guatemala refund
antidumping duties collected, and it is not clear what the panel's basis
was for distinguishing the two suggestions. Arguably, where initiation
was inappropriate, all antidumping duties were improperly collected and
should be refunded. If the panel's basis for rejecting this suggestion was
future conduct in general. (Hunter calls this the "specific" versus "general" remedy issue.)
See id. While this category may exist in theory, it is quite unlikely to exist in practice, as
Hunter concedes. Devoting analytical attention to an approach that is far removed from cur-
rent panel practice does not seem useful.
251. See Panel Report adopted June 26, 1992 re Procurement of Toll Collection Equip-
ment for the City of Trondheim, Committee on Government Procurement, GPR.DS2/R.
252. See Panel on New Zealand-Transformers, July 18, 1985, GATT B.I.S.D. (32d
Supp.) at 55 (1985); Canada-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Manufac-
tured Beef from the EEC: Report of the Panel, Oct. 13, 1987, SCM/85 (1987); United
States-Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Seamless Stainless Steel Hollow Products from
Sweden (unadopted), Aug. 20, 1990, ADP/47; Panel on United States-Countervailing Du-
ties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, July 11, 1991, GATr B.I.S.D. (38th
Supp.) at 30 (1991); Panel on United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lum-
ber from Canada, Oct. 27-28, 1993, GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 358 (1993).
253. Guatemala-Cement, supra note 96, paras. 4.402 et seq. and para. 8.1.
254. Id. paras. 8.1 and 8.2.
255. Id. para. 8.3.
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that Guatemala should be allowed discretion "in the first instance" to
implement the panel's ruling, then it is hard to see why the panel was
willing to suggest that Guatemala revoke the order. This is an inconsis-
tency in the panel's decision that is left unexplained.
The panel in India-Patent Protection arguably made a suggestion
for a retroactive remedy. The panel ruled that India had violated Article
70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement by failing to put in place a "mailbox"
system 6 The panel did not consider it sufficient, however, for India to
establish a "mailbox" system in order to conform to its obligations be-
cause U.S. companies would then be prejudiced in their future rights to
patent protection. The panel explained that:
As it appears that a number of United States' [sic] pharmaceuti-
cal companies do not believe that India has established a
mailbox application system, and consequently have not filed
applications for patent protection of pharmaceutical products, it
is reasonable to assume that potential applicants both in India
and outside the country have lost opportunities for patent pro-
tection for their products in a belief that there is no mechanism
to secure their rights. In this regard, we note that the interests of
those persons who would have filed patent applications had
there been an appropriate mechanism in place ... should be
protected, since the lack of an adequate mailbox application
system has effectively deprived them of benefits they would
have enjoyed in the future under the TRIPS Agreement.7
7
Thus, the panel took the position that India's willingness to conform
to its obligations going forward was not sufficient, and that India should
remedy the wrong done to the potential applicants who had not filed
applications due to the ambiguity in the Indian patent system. 5 ' Of in-
256. See discussion supra, at note 135 and accompanying text.
257. India-Patent Protection, supra note 75, para. 7.39; see also id. paras. 7.66 & 8.2
(panel suggests that in adopting a mailbox system, "India should take into account the inter-
ests of those persons who would have filed patent applications had an appropriate
mechanism been maintained.....).
258. The United States had not argued this position. As discussed below, the United
States consistently argues against retroactive remedies largely out of a concern that such
remedies could require refunds of antidumping and countervailing duties improperly col-
lected. This position is reflected in a little-noticed provision in the U.S. legislation
implementing the Uruguay Round results. Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act precludes the U.S. Commerce Department from refunding any antidumping or counter-
vailing duties in response to an adverse WTO panel decision. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(c)
(1994). Section 129 only authorizes the Commerce Department to revoke the underlying
order, or modify the duty rate, as to "unliquidated entries of the subject merchandise... that
are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after" the date on which
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terest, the Appellate Body appears, sub silentio, to have modified the
panel's suggestion in this regard. India did not appeal the panel's sug-
gestion as to a retroactive remedy. However, the Appellate Body-
without any discussion of this issue-did not include the suggestion
and, instead, merely recommended that the DSB request that India bring
its legal regime into conformity under the TRIPS Agreement. 5
With specific remedies, a question arises as to whether panels are
allowed to recommend particular actions as appropriate ways for a
Member to conform to its obligations, or whether panels must confine
themselves to a more general recommendation that the Member con-
form its conduct to its obligations.2
In United States- Underwear, the panel granted Costa Rica's re-
quest that the panel recommend a specific remedy. Costa Rica had
requested that if the panel found that a U.S. safeguard measure violated
the ATC, the panel should recommend that the United States withdraw
the illegal act. In response, the United States argued that DSU Article
19.1 prohibits panels from recommending such specific remedies.26'
The panel noted that the second sentence of Article 19.1 allowed it
to "'suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the
recommendations."2 62 The panel then suggested "that the United States
bring the measure challenged by Costa Rica into compliance with US ob-
ligations under the ATC by immediately withdrawing the measure.'""
This suggestion for a specific remedy was significant because the safe-
guard measure was due to expire in any event in March 1997.2
64
The United States has consistently argued against any specific and ret-
roactive remedies in the antidumping and countervailing duty area, based
on DSU Article 19.1. For instance, in Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, the
the U.S. Trade Representative directs the Commerce Department to revoke the order or
modify the duty rate. Id. § 3538(c)(1).
259. See India-Patent Protection (Appellate Body), supra note 144, para. 98.
260. Hunter terms this the "exclusive" remedy issue, since a panel suggestion that a
Member take a particular act may imply that that act is the only way to conform to its obli-
gations. See Hunter, supra note 43, at 579.
261. United States-Underwear (Panel Report), supra note 178, paras. 3.2, 3.4-3.6.
DSU Article 19.1 states that:
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with
a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the
measure into conformity with that Agreement. In addition to its recommendations,
the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned
could implement the recommendations.
The United States argues that Article 19.1 precludes panels from offering specific rec-
ommendations regarding how Members should conform with their obligations.
262. United States-Underwear (Panel Report), supra note 178, para. 8.2.
263. Id. para. 8.3.
264. See id. para. 7.1.
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United States argued against the Philippines' request that Brazil should
reimburse countervailing duties collected and took the position that the
panel should merely make a "general recommendation ... that Brazil
bring its countervailing duty order into conformity ... ,,65 The United
States argued that the DSU does not demonstrate any intention to treat
antidumping and countervailing duty disputes differently than other
types of disputes, and that the panel should not accord "any weight" to
three panel reports adopted before the WTO entered into force, which
had required the refund of duties.2 6 However, the panel did not reach
this issue and the decision was affirmed by the Appellate Body. 67
In Japan-Film, interestingly, the United States argued for a specific
suggestion regarding the appropriate means of implementing a panel
decision.2 The United States said that if the panel found Japan had
violated its WTO commitments, it "could suggest that Japan take steps
to undo the exclusionary aspects of the distribution system for photo-
graphic materials that its measure have brought about., 269 Similarly, if
the panel found that Japan's actions had "nullified or impaired" benefits
granted to the United States, the United States said that the panel should
recommend a "mutually satisfactory adjustment" under DSU art. 26.1.270
Due to the panel's ruling against the United States, the panel did not
address the U.S. arguments.
The no-retroactive-remedy rule is problematic in certain instances.
As an example, assume that a Member provides a large subsidy in a sin-
gle year. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures ("SCM Agreement") makes clear that such a subsidy should
be actionable. The SCM Agreement provides that "[s]ubsidies granted
prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the benefits
of which are allocated to future production, shall be included in the
overall rate of subsidization.,,27' The overall rate of subsidization is rele-
vant to the determination of whether a subsidy has caused "serious
prejudice" to the complaining member. Because a past subsidy must be
considered for purposes of determining serious prejudice, the subsidy is
actionable. However, even though the subsidy is actionable, the Member
265. Brazil-Desiccated Coconut (Panel Report), supra note 148, para. 220.
266. Id. para. 221. The panel reports are listed supra note 252.
267. More recently, the United States took the same position in Guatemala-Cement.
See Third-party Submission of the United States (June 25, 1997), in Guatemala-Cement
supra note 96 (available from Office of the United States Trade Representative).
268. Japan-Film, supra note 98, paras. 6.39-41.
269. Id. para 6.39.
270. Id. para. 6.40.
271. SCM Agreement, Annex IV, supra note 62, Annex IV, para. 7.
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can argue that, going forward, the member will conform to its WTO ob-
ligations because it is no longer providing the subsidy.272 This situation
inappropriately results in a finding that the subsidy is actionable, but
denies any effective remedy.
B. Compliance with WTO Rulings
Under the DSU, WTO Members are required to implement the deci-
sions of WTO panels and the Appellate Body and must do so within a
"reasonable time."273 These requirements have already led to significant
controversies over the nature and timing of Members' implementation
of adverse rulings. Practice regarding implementation has not had much
time to develop, given the newness of the WTO system and the small
number of cases that have had time to get through the entire dispute
resolution process. Consequently, the procedures for settling disagree-
ments over implementation are still evolving.
The DSU states that "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations
or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution
of disputes to the benefit of all Members."274 Article 21 states that losing
Members shall communicate to the DSB their intentions to comply with
the rulings within thirty days of the ruling's adoption. The exact nature
of the compliance, as discussed below, may be subject to negotiation
with the complaining Members and may vary significantly from case to
case.
Members will have a "reasonable time" to comply with an adverse
ruling. A "reasonable time" is either: (1) the period of time proposed by
the Member concerned, if approved by the DSB; (2) a period of time
mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within forty-five days after
the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or (3) if no
period is established under (1) or (2), then a period of time determined
through binding arbitration within ninety days after the date of adoption
of the recommendations and rulings."5 A guideline for the arbitrator in
Article 21.3(c) states that the reasonable period of time for implementa-
tion "should not exceed fifteen months from the [date of] adoption of a
272. See also id., art. 7.8, which requires a Member in this situation to "withdraw" the
subsidy or remove the adverse effects of the subsidy. Under the "no retroactive remedy"
approach, the Member could argue that it has withdrawn the subsidy since it is no longer
providing the subsidy. Id.
273. DSU, supra note 5, art. 21.1.
274. Id.
275. See Id. art. 21.3.
1259Summer 19981
Michigan Journal of International Law
panel or Appellate Body report." 116 Special circumstances may give rise
to a shorter or longer implementation period. 77
The DSB is required to "keep under surveillance" compliance with
panel and Appellate Body reports under Article 21.6. Issues with regard
to implementation may be raised with the DSB at any time by any
Member. If a ruling is not satisfactorily implemented within a reason-
able time, compensation and retaliation are available to the injured
Member under Article 22 of the DSU. These are considered temporary
measures. Compensation is voluntary on the part of the compensating
member, and if no compensation is offered or agreed upon, the injured
Member may ask the DSB for permission to retaliate by suspending
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements. The
DSU states that neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions
is preferred to full implementation of panel rulings.76
Practice under the WTO system to date has shown that the fifteen-
month time frame cited in the DSU is becoming the de facto definition
of "reasonable time" for implementation. In the cases that have been
decided so far, the offending Member has either complied within that
period or has provided compensation to the complaining Member.
In the United States-Gasoline279 case, the United States took the
entire fifteen-month period to comply with an adverse Appellate Body
ruling. Venezuela and Brazil challenged a U.S. law that required foreign
gasoline refiners to adhere to a statutory pollutant baseline but allowed
domestic refiners to choose to establish a baseline corresponding to their
1990 gasoline quality. The WTO panel concluded that the U.S. law dis-
criminated against foreign refiners, and the Appellate Body affirmed.
The United States accepted the ruling, and the EPA issued regulations
implementing the decision just one day before its deadline, on August
19, 1997."0 In September of that year, Venezuela and Brazil requested
276. Id.
277. See id. Determination of what constitutes a "reasonable time" in a particular case
should be made within fifteen months of the establishment of the panel. See DSU, supra note
5, art. 21.3.
278. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22.1. This may mean that implementation is preferred
to the other alternatives, but the language is far from clear. The provision raises the important
issue of whether members have an international law obligation to implement panel rulings.
See note 249, supra.
279. WTO Secretariat, United States--Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline: Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996) (last down-
loaded May 19, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter United
States-Gasoline (Panel Report) and United States-Gasoline (Appellate Body)].
280. See U.S. Meets Deadline in WTO Gas Case But Rule Could Face Suit From Refin-
ers, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 22, 1997, at 3. These regulations are being challenged by
domestic gasoline refiners, who maintain that EPA violated its statutory mandate when it
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an update on the implementation process. The United States said it con-
sidered its obligations to have been met with the implementation of the
EPA regulations, but that it would submit an update at the DSB the fol-
lowing month."
Japan-Alcohol Taxes was the first case to involve a ruling on im-
plementation of a WTO decision. In Japan-Alcohol Taxes, the United
States complained to the DSU that Japan was taxing imported vodka
and other liquors at a rate higher than a domestic like product, shochu.
After losing the case before the panel and the Appellate Body, Japan
told the DSB that Japan intended to comply with the ruling but proposed
an implementation plan that would take five years due to the complex
changes that would need to be made to its tax code. 2 The United States
objected to this time frame and cited U.S. compliance in the required
fifteen months in the United States-Gasoline case and the danger of
setting a bad precedent for compliance with WTO rulings.23 After sev-
eral unsuccessful negotiation attempts, the United States requested
Article 21 arbitration-the first such request under the new WTO sys-
tem. Because the two countries could not agree on an arbitrator, WTO
Director-General Ruggiero appointed one.2m On February 14, 1997, the
arbitrator ruled that Japan was required to comply within fifteen months,
compensate the United States, or be subject to the United States' re-
taliation.2 5
took into account non-environmental factors in writing regulations implementing the WTO
ruling. U.S. Gas Refiners Challenge EPA's Implementation of WTO Ruling, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 7, 1997, at 25. The effect on the WTO system as a whole, and on the
"reasonable time" requirements specifically, of a Member's implementation measures being
challenged domestically has not yet been tested.
281. See EU Accepts Banana Ruling But Reveals Little About Future Response, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Sept. 26, 1997, at 6.
282. The Japanese plan was to change the taxes in stages. The first stage with respect to
one kind of shochu would take place October 1, 1997, and the second stage would take place
October 1, 1998, thirteen months after the adoption of the Appellate Body report. Corre-
sponding reductions in tariffs on imported brandy and whiskey would occur on those dates as
well. With respect to a second kind of shochu, three stages were proposed. The first two
would correspond to the above dates, but the third stage would not take place until October
2001, five years after the adoption of the Appellate Body report. See U.S. Disputes Japanese
Plan to Implement Liquor Panel, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 10, 1997, at 21-22.
283. See U.S. Keeps Heat On Japan to Implement Liquor Panel By February, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Oct. 3, 1997, at 9.
284. See U.S. Requests Arbitration Over Japan's Implementation of Liquor Panel,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1, 21-22.
285. See Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Arbitration under Article 21(3)(c) of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Feb. 14,
1997). See also Japan Searching for Response to WTO Arbitration Ruling on Liquor, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Feb. 21, 1997, at 8-9.
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The United States and Japan had several more rounds of negotia-
tions.. after the arbitration ruling came down. The United States
threatened to seek permission to retaliate against Japan, and negotiations
were ongoing regarding Japan's payment of compensation to the United
States in the event of noncompliance. The two countries eventually
agreed that Japan would comply within four years and pay the United
States compensation in the interim."' The case demonstrates that com-
pliance taking more than fifteen months is likely to require the payment
of compensation to the complaining Member.
There are a few ongoing implementation disputes in the WTO. One
such dispute concerns the EC-Bananas case, which raises an interesting
issue as to negotiations between the parties during the implementation
period. In that case, the Appellate Body found that the EU was regulating
banana imports in violation of WTO rules through imposition of restric-
tions on Latin American bananas. The EU indicated its intent to comply
with the Appellate Body ruling but did so in cryptic terms, saying only
that the EU intended to respect its "international obligations.""28 When
informal talks proved unproductive, the United States requested that an
arbitrator be appointed by the WTO Director-General, both to gain a
stronger commitment from the EU on implementation and to speed that
implementation. The complaining parties argued that full implementa-
tion of the ruling was "practicable" in only nine months, and therefore
the EU's request for the full fifteen months was excessive. The arbitrator
ruled that the EU had the customary fifteen months in which to com-
ply.
28 9
The United States and the four other complainants in the EC-
Bananas case requested that the EU begin settlement talks with them
and insisted that the EU give interested parties the opportunity to par-
286. The EU, which, along with Canada and the United States, was a complainant in
the Japan-Alcohol Taxes case, claimed the right to participate in the United States arbitra-
tion and negotiation with Japan over implementation. Before the arbitrator ruled, the EU and
Japan agreed that, in exchange for the lowering of Japanese tariffs on European whiskey and
brandy, the EU would give Japan up to five years to implement the Appellate Body's deci-
sion. A provision of the agreement stated that if the United States were to accept a more
attractive offer from Japan in the arbitration process, the EU would have the right to negoti-
ate for more concessions. See EU, Japan Agree on Implementation of WTO Liquor Tax
Decision, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 7, 1997, at 14-15.
287. See U.S. Claims Victory in WTO Settlement With Japan Over Liquor Tax, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Dec. 19, 1997, at 1, 17-18.
288. U.S. Asks For Arbitrator in Fight With EU Over WTO Banana Ruling, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Dec. 5, 1997, at 11.
289. See EU Commission Readies Proposal to Comply With WTO Banana Ruling,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 9, 1998, at 1-2.
1262 [Vol. 19:1195
Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution
ticipate in the process of changing its banana regime.m The EU claims
that the pressure placed on it by the United States "amount[s] to a
change in the dispute settlement rules."9' The EU maintains that it is
not required to negotiate the substance of its rules-change during the
implementation period and argued that a country is only obligated to
negotiate substantive issues when a country fails to bring its measures
into compliance after a reasonable time, or within fifteen months; then,
if no compensation can be agreed upon, the complainants may request
the right to retaliate.92 The EU developed a plan for implementation
without consultations with the complainants, to which the United States
objects, saying that the plan continues to discriminate against Latin
American bananas. 93 Criticisms back and forth have not produced
agreement, and the United States and other complainants still claim the
EU is "dragging its feet" in implementing the decision. 9' Recently, the
United States has threatened to reconvene the WTO panel in order to
obtain full implementation of the panel report. 95
The two above completed cases and the arbitrator's ruling in EC-
Bananas suggest that WTO Members are willing to comply with panel
and Appellate Body rulings and that in most circumstances the fifteen-
month implementation period will constitute the time frame in which
compliance or compensation must occur. What factors must be consid-
ered in implementation and whether interested parties must be allowed
to participate in implementation decisions remains undecided.
Also ongoing is the EC-Beef Hormones case. In that case, the
United States challenged the EU's ban on beef raised with growth hor-
mones as violation of the WTO. The panel and the Appellate Body ruled
against the EU and said that the ban is not scientifically justified under
the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. The United States has argued that the ban should be lifted
immediately because of the lack of scientific evidence and the ease of
compliance. Thus far, the EU has refused to specify how it will comply
with the ruling and has said only that the EU will "honor its WTO obli-
290. See EU U.S. to Make Case to Arbitrator on Bananas for Decision Next Week,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 19, 1997, at 17.
291. U.S. Asks For Arbitrator in Fight With EU Over WTO Banana Ruling, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Dec. 5, 1997, at 11. The rules in question are DSU Articles 21 and 22.
292. See EU, U.S. to Make Case to Arbitrator on Bananas for Decision Next Week,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 19, 1997, at 17.
293. See U.S. Rejects New EU Plan For Banana Regime as Violating WTO Rules,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 16, 1998, at 1, 14.
294. WTO DSB Reviews Lingering Disputes, WASH. TRADE DAILY, Mar. 26, 1998, at 1.
295. See U.S. Threatens to Re-submit EU Banana Case to WTO, Washington Trade
Daily, July 24, 1998, at 2.
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gations" in "'as short a time as possible.' ,,2 While keeping the ban in
place, the EU is planning to carry out four new risk assessment studies
on the hormones, which the United States claims is evidence of the EU's
intention not to comply.9 The progression of this and other disputes as
to proper implementation will set the stage for future WTO cases and
determine the strength of the new WTO system in forcing compliance
with panel and Appellate Body decisions 9
As a final point, there have been no cases that have involved a re-
quest for permission from the DSB to retaliate because of a Member's
noncompliance. Had the United States and Japan not finally reached a
mutually acceptable solution in Japan-Alcohol Taxes, those procedures
might have been used for the first time. This possibility is not foreclosed
in the EC-Bananas case either, as the fifteen-month implementation
period will not run until January 1, 1999.
V. ISSUES IN APPELLATE BODY REVIEW
This section addresses three issues that have arisen in Appellate
Body proceedings: the scope of the substantive claims before the Ap-
pellate Body, how to decide whether a particular issue is legal (rather
than factual), and the standard of review to be applied.299
296. EU to Reveal Few Details of Plans to Comply With Hormone Panel, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 13, 1998, at 3.
297. See Highlights, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 449 (1998). The United States has
threatened unilateral retaliation or further action under WTO dispute settlement. See also,
Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Threatens Trade Action Against European Union Over Beef Import
Ban, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 510 (Mar. 25, 1998). The EU has recently asked for WTO
arbitration to decide the issue of how long it will have to implement the Appellate Body's
decision. See EU Asks for WTO Arbitration on Implementation of Hormone Panel, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, April 10, 1998, at 3.
298. Another such case is WTO Secretariat, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals: AB-1997-2, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997) (last downloaded May 20, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletinl.htm> [hereinafter Canada-Periodicals]. In that case,
a Canadian measure was found to discriminate against periodicals from the United States.
The United States claims that Canada is delaying implementation and not providing enough
information about how it intends to comply, which risks prolonging the settlement date. See
WTO DSB Reviews Lingering Disputes, WASH. TRADE DAILY, Mar. 26, 1998, at 2.
299. Of course, other issues may be litigated regarding Appellate Body procedure. For
instance, with respect to standing, DSU Article 17.4 allows third parties to intervene at the
appellate stage if they have "notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter.....
Whether the "substantial interest" claim is itself subject to review by the Appellate Body,
i.e., whether the Appellate Body might exclude third parties from intervention, is an inter-
esting question. DSU art 17.4.
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A. Scope of Review
In a fashion similar to panels (as discussed in Section III.A above),
the Appellate Body will only consider issues that are identified in a
Member's notice of appeal. The Appellate Body's Working Procedures
require that a notice for appeal shall include "a brief statement of the
nature of the appeal, including the allegations of errors.. . ." 0 In addi-
tion, the Working Procedures require that an appellant's first submission
shall set out "a precise statement of the grounds for the appeal, includ-
ing the specific allegations of errors in the issues of law covered in the
panel report ... and the legal arguments in support thereof."1 There-
fore, if an appellant fails to include a claim in the appeal request, the
Appellate Body normally will refuse to rule on the issue.
For instance, in EC-Bananas, Ecuador argued that the EC did not
properly set out a particular allegation of error in Ecuador's Notice of
Appeal or in Ecuador's first submission and thereby failed to meet the
requirements of the Working Procedures. The Appellate Body agreed
that there was no "specific mention" of this allegation in either docu-
ment, so that Ecuador had no notice that the EC was appealing on this
issue. The Appellate Body excluded this allegation from the scope of
the appeal.302 Similarly, in United States-Gasoline, the Appellate Body
listed particular issues that were "dealt with in the Panel proceedings but
which have not been brought before the Appellate Body in this appeal,
and which we accordingly exclude from consideration in this Appellate
Report." 303
In Canada-Periodicals, the Appellate Body was willing to rule on
a provision that was not cited in the appeal request, given the provi-
sion's close relationship with a provision that had been cited.3' The
notice of appeal had referred to the first sentence of GATT Article 111:2;
the Appellate Body agreed to consider an argument based on the second
sentence of this Article. The Appellate Body viewed the two provisions
as "part of a logical continuum." o' This approach is similar to the prac-
300. WTO Secretariat, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/3, para.
20(2)(d) (Feb. 28, 1997) (last downloaded May 19, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/
wto/dispute/ab3.htm> [hereinafter Working Procedures].
301. Id. R.21(2)(b)(i).
302. See EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, paras. 148-52.
303. United States-Gasoline (Appellate Body), supra note 279, at 9. The Appellate
Body also specifically refused to consider two issues raised by Venezuela and Brazil in that
case because those Members had not appealed the panel's decision but had instead argued in
their Appellees' Submissions that the panel had erred in two respects. Id. at 11-12.
304. See Canada-Periodicals (Appellate Body), supra note 298, at 25-26.
305. Id. at 25. The Appellate Body cited its prior decision in United States-Gasoline,
where it had considered the chapeau of Article XX even though the panel had not ruled on
1265Summer 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
tice of panels, discussed earlier, of considering legal claims as long as
they relate to the same "problem." However, the Appellate Body may
be applying a more flexible standard in its own proceedings than in
panel proceedings because in the panel context the Appellate Body has
mandated that panel requests must identify the specific provision in-
volved.3°
B. Issues of Law vs. Issues of Fact
Under DSU Article 17.6, an appeal is limited to "issues of law cov-
ered in the panel report and legal interpretation[s] developed by the
panel." ' Article 17.6 therefore raises the difficult distinction between
issues of law and issues of fact."°
In EC-Beef Hormones, the Appellate Body provided an extensive
discussion of this issue:
Findings of fact, as distinguished from legal interpretations or
legal conclusions, by a panel are, in principle, not subject to re-
view by the Appellate Body. The determination of whether or
not a certain event did occur in time and space is typically a
question of fact; for example, the question of whether or not
Codex has adopted an international standard, guideline or rec-
ommendation on MGA is a factual question. Determination of
the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to (that is, the
appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and parcel of
the fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the discretion
of a panel as the trier of facts. The consistency or inconsistency
of a given fact or set of facts with the requirements of a given
treaty provision is, however, a legal characterization issue. It is a
legal question. Whether or not a panel has made an objective as-
sessment of the facts before it, as required by Article 11 of the
this issue and, therefore, the issue was not appealed. Id. In United States-Gasoline, the
Appellate Body had to address the chapeau of Article XX even though it had not been dis-
cussed by the Panel. This raises the problem of the issue of "judicial economy," discussed
above: because the Appellate Body lacks remand authority, it can find itself in the situation
where it must address an issue for the first time on appeal.
306. See discussion supra, Part III.A.
307. See EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, paras. 141-43.
308. DSU, supra note 5, art. 17.6.
309. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 54, at 200 n.32 (describing the law/fact distinc-
tion as "troublesome", in the context of Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement);
Petersmann, supra note 2, at 68 (stating in the context of DSU Article 17.6 that
"distinguishing law from fact, and defining the limits for new legal arguments, are notori-
ously difficult").
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DSU, is also a legal question which, if properly raised on ap-
peal, would fall within the scope of appellate review."O
Based on this, the Appellate Body proceeded to consider the legal
question of whether the panel in that case had made an "objective as-
sessment" of the facts, in response to the EC's argument that the panel
had disregarded evidence submitted to it."
The Appellate Body's explanation, above, of law versus fact does
not acknowledge the inherent ambiguities and difficulties involved in
this distinction. A decision regarding the "weight" or "appreciation" of
evidence is likely to dictate, in many cases, whether the underlying facts
are consistent with the "requirements of a given treaty provision." In
other words, there are many mixed questions of fact and law.'
In some cases, the law/fact distinction is not particularly difficult.
For instance, in EC-Bananas, the Appellate Body refused to consider
the EC's appeal of several aspects of the panel's rulings on the ground
that these issues were "all factual conclusions." ' However, in other
situations, the law/fact problem can become very important, especially
because the Appellate Body apparently lacks power to remand the case
to the panel for further proceedings. DSU Article 17.13 provides that
"[t]he Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings
and conclusions of the panel. 314 This provision does not appear to
authorize the Appellate Body to remand to the panel for further pro-
ceedings, a conclusion reinforced by the absence of any remand
procedures in the DSU.31
310. EC-Beef Hormones (Appellate Body), supra note 196, para. 132.
311. Despite the Appellate Body's articulation of this standard, the Appellate Body
later in its decision appears to engage in the "[d]etermination of the credibility and weight"
of evidence that it says it cannot do. See EC-Beef Hormones (Appellate Body), supra note
196, paras. 197 nn. 180, 222-25. See also discussion infra, notes 320-322.
312. See AMAN & MAYTON, at 441-43 (1993) (discussing the "mixed question of fact
and law" that arises where a court reviews whether the agency correctly applied the law to
the facts).
313. EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note 28, para. 239. The EC had tried to
style these challenges as involving the panel's misapplication of the "burden of proof." In
other words, the EU had argued that the panel had improperly found that the Complaining
Parties had satisfied their burden of proof on these issues, under the standard set forth in
United States-Wool Shirts (Appellate Body). See EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra 28,
paras. 53-55.
314. DSU, supra note 5, at art. 17.13.
315. See also id. art. 17.14 (providing for adoption of an Appellate Body report unless
the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report). The adoption of the Appellate Body
report appears to conclude the proceedings. However, Petersmann views the question of
remand authority as an open issue that will require clarification by the Appellate Body. He
acknowledges that implying such remand authority probably "would imply that the strict
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The absence of remand authority could create a serious risk of diffi-
culties when combined with both the Appellate Body's inability to make
factual findings and the practice of panels of engaging in "judicial econ-
omy" and thereby avoiding the discussion of arguments that they
consider as unnecessary. As a result, the Appellate Body could reverse a
panel decision on an issue of law, but finds itself unable to address other
contentions made by the parties because the necessary factual record
does not exist. The Appellate Body also finds itself unable to remand to
the panel for further proceedings.3"6
In Canada-Periodicals, the Appellate Body appears to have en-
countered this problem. The panel had found that imported United
States "split-run" periodicals and Canadian "non-split-run" periodicals
were like products under GATT 1994 Article 111:2, first sentence. The
Appellate Body rejected the panel's reasoning that had led to this con-
clusion. 17 This holding presented the Appellate Body with the question
of whether the U.S. periodicals and the Canadian periodicals were actu-
ally like products, even if the panel had reasoned incorrectly in reaching
this conclusion. The Appellate Body stated that:
We are mindful of the limitation of our mandate in Articles 17.6
and 17.13 of the DSU. According to Article 17.6, an appeal
shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel Report and
legal interpretations developed by the Panel. The determination
of whether imported and domestic products are "like products"
is a process by which legal rules have to be applied to facts. In
any analysis of Article 111:2, first sentence, this process is par-
ticularly delicate, since "likeness" must be construed narrowly
and on a case-by-case basis. We note that, due to the absence of
adequate analysis of the Panel Report in this respect, it is not
possible to proceed to a determination of like products .
time-limits for decisions of the DSB cannot be met." Petersmann, supra note 2, at 68 (citing
DSU art. 20).
316. See Debra P. Steger and Susan M. Hainsworth, New Directions in International
Trade Law: WTO Dispute Settlement, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, supra note 161, 28, 56-57 ("Given the Appellate Body's limited jurisdiction
to questions of law, it is sometimes difficult for the Appellate Body, in situations where it has
reversed a legal conclusion of a panel, to decide how to modify the panel's conclusions.");
David Palmeter, The WTO Appellate Body Needs Remand Authority, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 41
(1998). See also McGovern, supra note 53, § 2.233 (suggesting that "[iut is possible that, at
least in uncomplicated disputes, panels will seek to avoid this outcome by suggesting what
their conclusion would have been had they adopted alternative interpretations of the legal
framework"). As discussed supra at notes 162-164, this suggestion already has been taken
up by one panel, in India-Patent Protection.
317. See Canada-Periodicals (Appellate Body), supra note 298, at 23.
318. Id. at 23-24.
1268 [Vol. 19:1195
Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution
Thus, the Appellate Body acknowledged that the United States and
Canadian products might be like products, but found that it could not
make a finding on this issue due to the absence of a sufficient record.
Because remand was not possible, the result was to prevent a finding
that the products were "like." This result seems problematic because it
shows the real potential for issues to be resolved one way or the other
based simply on procedural developments rather than substantive rul-
ings on the merits.
Conversely, in EC-Beef Hormones, the Appellate Body may have
engaged in factual findings in order to resolve the dispute, after it re-
versed the panel on a question of law. As discussed earlier, the
Appellate Body found that the panel had erred in assigning the burden
of proof to the EC in that case and held that the panel should have re-
quired the United States to make a prima facie case that the EC had
violated its obligations. However, the Appellate Body could not remand
to the panel for a determination whether the United States had estab-
lished this prima facie case, due to the absence of remand authority.
Instead, the Appellate Body itself engaged in "careful consideration of
the panel record" and pronounced itself "satisfied that the United States
... although not required to do so by the Panel, did, in fact, make this
prima facie case . 319 This review of the "panel record" appears to
walk a narrow line between questions of fact and law because the Ap-
pellate Body inevitably had to consider questions of the significance of
certain pieces of evidence in order to decide whether a prima facie case
existed.
Also in EC-Beef Hormones, the Appellate Body decided that it
was authorized to make a factual finding in order to resolve an ultimate
question of law decided by the panel. The panel had declined to decide
whether the difference in the levels of protection set by the EC for hor-
mones used as growth promoters (i.e., in cattle) and for hormones used
for other purposes was justified, because the panel had decided that any
difference in the level of protection was unjustifiable discrimination un-
der Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. 20 The Appellate Body disagreed
that any difference in the level of protection was unjustifiable discrimi-
nation and therefore was faced with the question of whether the
difference in the levels was justified, a question that the panel had not
reached. The Appellate Body found it "appropriate to complete the
Panel's analysis in order that we may be in a position to review the
Panel's conclusion concerning consistency with Article 5.5 as a
319. EC-Beef Hormones (Appellate Body), supra note 196, para. 197, n. 180.
320. See id. para. 222.
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whole."321 The Appellate Body then found that the difference in the lev-
els of protection was not arbitrary discrimination, and in so doing, made
several factual findings based on its review of the facts contained in the
panel record."'
In its most recent interpretation of its jurisdiction, EC-Poultry, the
Appellate Body appeared to take a somewhat inconsistent position. On
the one hand, the Appellate Body ruled that under DSU art. 17.13,
where there is "no finding by the Panel or legal interpretation by the
Panel... there is, therefore, no finding nor any 'legal interpretation de-
veloped by the panel' that may be the subject of an appeal of which the
Appellate Body may take cognizance."323 Essentially, the Appellate
Body stated that because the panel had made no findings on the issue
raised by the appellant, Brazil, the Appellate Body lacked jurisdiction
over the issue. On the other hand, the Appellate body also held in EC-
Poultry that where the Appellate Body had reversed the panel's inter-
pretation of a legal issue, the Appellate Body had the authority to make
a finding on a legal issue that was not addressed by the panel for reasons
of judicial economy.324 From the textual perspective, it is unclear how to
reconcile these two conclusions: if the lack of a panel finding precludes
Appellate Body jurisdiction, this rule should also apply in the situation
where the lack of a panel finding was due to the application of the judi-
cial economy approach.
C. Standard of Review of Panel Decisions
Is the Appellate Body charged with a de novo review of the panel's
legal conclusions, or is any deference due to the panel's more in-depth
review of the record and arguments? In the cases that have come before
it, the Appellate Body has essentially applied de novo review, modifying
panel legal reasoning with which it disagreed.
321. Id. The Appellate Body noted that this factual issue "was fully argued before the
Panel," apparently to emphasize that there was a complete factual record before it (the Ap-
pellate Body). Id. However, the Appellate Body's ability to make a factual finding, based on
the completeness of the record, does not answer the question of whether the factual finding
should be made, given the limitations on Appellate Body jurisdiction.
322. See id. paras. 223-25. The Appellate Body found that there were significant dif-
ferences between the use of hormones for growth purposes and for other purposes, with
respect to (a) the frequency and scale of the treatment, and (b) the mode of administration of
the hormones. Id.
323. Id. para. 107.
324. See id. para. 156. The Appellate Body stated that '[in certain appeals, however,
the reversal of a panel's finding on a legal issue may require us to make a finding on a legal
issue which was not addressed by the panel." Id. The Appellate Body cited as authority its
decisions in United States-Gasoline and Canada-Periodicals, discussed above. See id.
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In Canada-Periodicals, the Appellate Body reversed a panel con-
clusion that had been reached without proper legal reasoning and on
inadequate factual analysis, noting that the panel "did not base its find-
ings on the exhibits and evidence before it."'32 In EC-Beef Hormones,
the Appellate Body reversed a panel's finding as "unjustified and erro-
neous as a matter of law" 
326
A more lenient standard of review applies with respect to review of
procedural decisions by the panel. The Appellate Body will require a
showing of "prejudice" before reversing a panel's decision on "matters
of procedures"-i.e., matters relating to the panel's own proceedings. 327
On such procedural matters, an appellant's demonstration that the panel
made an error of law apparently will not be sufficient; the appellant will
also have to demonstrate that the error caused "prejudice" to the appel-
lant's case.
In Argentina-Footwear, Argentina argued that the panel had com-
mitted errors of law on several issues by failing to make an "objective
assessment of the matter" under Article 11 and by failing to "set out...
the basic rationale behind any findings and recommendations that it
makes."3 28 The Appellate Body rejected each of these arguments. The
Appellate Body did not discuss the standard of review that is generally
applicable to panel rulings. The Appellate Body did state that "while
another panel could well have exercised its discretion differently, we do
not believe that the Panel here committed an abuse of discretion
amounting to a failure to render an objective assessment of the matter as
mandated by Article 1 1 of the DSU.''32 However, this statement was
made in the context of an argument regarding a procedural error by the
panel, and probably reflects the wide latitude the Appellate Body ex-
tends to panels in their procedural operations, as reflected in the EC-
Beef Hormones decision discussed above.
An interesting question arises as to whether there is a standard of
review for a panel's factual findings. As discussed earlier, the Appellate
Body's jurisdiction is limited to issues of law and legal interpretations
by the panel. However, it appears that at least to some degree, the Ap-
pellate Body could review a panel's factual findings albeit under a quite
deferential standard of review. Article 12.7 of the DSU provides that
325. Canada-Periodicals (Appellate Body), supra note 298, at 22.
326. EC-Beef Hormones (Appellate Body), supra note 196, para. 246.
327. Id. para. 152, n. 138 (reasoning that the DSU "leave[s] panels a margin of discre-
tion to deal, always in accordance with due process, with specific situations that may arise in
a particular case and that are not explicitly regulated").
328. Argentina-Footwear (Appellate Body), supra note 74, paras. 66, 75, 82.
329. Id. para. 81.
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"the report of a panel shall set out the findings of fact, the applicability
of relevant provisions, and the basic rationale behind any findings and
recommendations" that the panel makes.330
The requirement for a "basic rationale" behind the panel's factual
findings may provide an implicit standard of review, in conjunction with
the requirement that a panel conduct an "objective assessment" of the
facts, under DSU Article 11. Taken together, these provisions suggest
that a panel must act reasonably in making factual findings. For exam-
ple, as argued by the EC in EC-Beef Hormones, the Appellate Body
could find that a panel's findings were not made in good faith and there-
fore were not reasonable. However, the requirement for a "basic
rationale" and an "objective assessment" could be violated even where
the panel acts in good faith, if the panel ignored relevant facts or used
incorrect reasoning."' Conversely, it would be inappropriate for the Ap-
pellate Body itself to conduct an "objective assessment" of the facts to
determine whether the panel was correct or not, rather than simply de-
termining whether the panel acted reasonably.332
One commentator argues that the Appellate Body should develop
"some concept of a 'standard of review'" and "might adopt a less intru-
sive, more deferential standard of review." '333 He argues that such
deference to panel decisions is warranted given the many new provi-
sions in the WTO Agreements that "need honing and refining over
time," and that interpretation "is not an exact science."", So far, the is-
sue is a difficult one, as it requires the Appellate Body to balance the
value of early, clear statements of law, against the value of permitting
the gradual evolution of jurisprudence in a complex area. Ultimately, it
may be appropriate for the WTO Members to consider this issue as they
review the WTO dispute settlement process.
330. DSU, supra note 5, art. 17.2, cited in EC-Bananas (Appellate Body), supra note
28, para. 251 (stating that a panel is required to provide a "basic rationale" for its decision).
331. See Maurits Lugard, Scope of Appellate Review: Objective Assessment of the Facts
and Issues of Law, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L., 323-27 (1998) (criticizing the EC-Beef Hormones
decision for limiting review of panel factual findings to whether the panel acted in bad faith,
and noting that this approach appears to mandate an inquiry into the panelists' subjective
intent).
332. One commentator argues that "[a] review of how the Appellate Body applied this
standard to the facts of Beef Hormones... indicates that the standard was not applied in a
particularly deferential way. The Appellate Body engaged in a thorough and searching in-
quiry, adopting some factual findings of the Panel and rejecting others:' Paul Rosenthal,
"Comments on Scope for National Regulation" in 32 INT'L LAWYER (1998).
333. McRae, supra note 161, at 109-10.
334. Id. at 110.
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CONCLUSION
As discussed in the introduction, this article has aimed to identify
the particularly significant issues that are arising in WTO dispute reso-
lution and provide a useful analysis of the decisions issued to date. The
topic does not lend itself to conclusions of a general nature, given the
diverse nature of the issues, ranging from the right-to-counsel of WTO
Members to the burden of proof in WTO proceedings. General conclu-
sions are also problematic due to the fact that the WTO dispute
settlement system has been in operation for only three years. Nonethe-
less, a few observations may be appropriate.
Probably the most important aspect of the initial decisions is that
WTO panels and particularly the Appellate Body have demonstrated an
intention to follow the DSU text quite closely. The Appellate Body has
been critical of panels that, in the Appellate Body's judgment, have
varied from the DSU text, as evidenced, for instance, by the reversals of
the panel decisions in Japan-Alcohol Taxes and India-Patent Protec-
tion. This approach is not surprising in a new institution, particularly
one that is as controversial as the World Trade Organization because the
judicial bodies are likely to be quite cautious in order to establish their
legitimacy.
The strict obedience to the DSU text, interestingly, has resulted in
panels and the Appellate Body allowing substantial procedural leeway
in areas that are not addressed by the DSU text. For instance, in EC-
Bananas, the Appellate Body allowed Saint Lucia to be represented by
counsel in part because nothing in the DSU addressed this issue. Also in
the EC-Bananas case, the panel found that the United States had
standing to challenge the EC's bananas regime, in part because the DSU
did not contain any express requirement that a Member must have a
"legal interest" in order to request a panel.
The strict adherence to the DSU text, however, may deny panels
adequate discretion to maneuver in areas that are addressed by the DSU.
For instance, if a panel's scope of review is tightly constrained by the
terms of reference, this may allow Members to circumvent their WTO
obligations by abolishing measures just before the terms of reference
are set and then revising them after the panel ruling. A strict interpreta-
tion of a panel's terms of reference could also deny panels any ability to
consider claims raised in response to facts disclosed for the first time in
the panel proceedings, as in India-Patent Protection. Similarly, in the
standard of review area, as discussed earlier, allowing panels to apply a
different standard of review to factual issues, depending upon the na-
tional procedures involved, seems appropriate. Yet it is unclear whether
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the requirement of an "objective assessment" of the facts, if strictly ap-
plied, would allow panels to tailor their approach to the diversity of
legal contexts.
Finally, the close obedience by panels and the Appellate Body to the
DSU text increases the importance of the review of the WTO dispute
settlement system that is ongoing in 1998."'5 If the panels and the Ap-
pellate Body are to take a "plain meaning" approach to the DSU text,
then it becomes incumbent upon the WTO Members to consider the
terms of that text extremely carefully in light of the decisions that have
issued to date, and to decide whether any changes are warranted.
335. This review is mandated by the Ministerial Decision on the Application and Re-
view of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
which requires a "full review of dispute settlement rules and procedures" within four years
after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement-i.e. by January 1, 1999. This decision is
available on the WTO's website at <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/dsu.htm.
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